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Chapter 1
Introduction
It is clear from reading any newspaper or magazine, that unemployment is an important
issue. Never a day goes by without unemployment being mentioned somewhere in a
discussion. Unemployment surely is a huge issue facino many countries. But why should
unemployment be such a major topic of ciiscussion? Why is unemployment such an
important issue? First of all, unemployment is a waste. Labour is an extremely important
resource and unemployment must surely be the greatest misuse of labour. This misuse of
labour, i.e. allowing people to remain idle despite the fact that they would choose to work
if offered a job, coupled with the fact that there are many human wants which remain
unsatisfied, has an enonnous cost. It is ridiculous that many human wants go unsatisfied
whilst simultaneously the human resources which could be utilised to satisfy those wants
go unused. On top of this, unemployment has social costs in that it lowers the self esteem
of those people who are forced into periods of unemployment. The unemployed worker,
forced to accept handouts from the government, often feels unwanted and a burden on
society. Furthermore, those not in unemployment often resent what they see as the funding
of idleness.
Unemployment aftècts everyone. Even if an individual is not unemployed, they are
affected by unemployment in that they may have experienced it in the past, or may
experience it in the fiiture. The threat of unentployment is always there, even for those
individuals who never expect to be unemployed. Furthennore, an individual who is not
unemployed must contribute towards maintainin~ the pool of unemployed in that that
individual must pay towards unemployment benefit provision.
Whilst a certain amount of unemployment is inevitable in a labour market, i.e. frictional
unemployment is essential in any labour market, this does not mean that unemployment
should be at the excessive levels experienced by many countries in the 1980s. Not all of
the unemployment of the Thatcher period, for example, was frictional. On the contrary,
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much of it was demand-deficient unemployment. And whilst frictional unemployment can
be seen as beneficial in that it is an essential part of any well-functioning labour market,
other types of unemployment cannot. However, if we can reduce the level of frictional
unemployment in the labour market, this is no bad thing.
At the end of the second World War, many people were viewing the possibility of a peace
where full employment was the social norm. What full employment actually meant,
however, was not totally clear. Beveridge (1944), for example, one of the architects of the
post-war British welfare state, considered full employment to be in the region of 40~0
unemployment. Up to and including the 1970s, this was more or less achieved. The
avera~e rate of unemployment in Britain in the 1970s was less than 4.So~o. By the early
1980s, however, many observers realised that the post-war epoch of full employment was
gone and in its place was a situation where high rates of unemployment were the norm.
Looking at Great Britain, for example, those halcyon days of full employment have long
gone. Not once, since the late 1970s, has unemployment been anywhere near that 40~0
figure. Perhaps not too surprisingly, many people in Britain no longer regard an
unemployment rate approachin~ IOo~o as anything but normal. Indeed, surely it would have
been electoral disaster in the 19GOs for any government in power to allow a rate of
unemployment of today's levels to persist? Who in the 1960s would have envisaged a
situation where unemployment rates approachin~ l00~o were considered acceptable and the
nonn? Yet this is precisely the situation which has developed.
We see then, that unemployment is a problem, not just for Great Britain, but also for many
other western countries~. But it is more than just a problem it is a problem on a huge
scale. Millions of workers find themselves in unemployment, often through no fault of
their own. Work is an important part of an individual's identity; it is an important part of a
person's social well-being. Take away that person's job, and you take away an important
part of their identity and their well-being. When this applies to many millions of individuals
who are unemployed, that means a lot of people who are experiencing a level of happiness
which is below that which is possible. Furthermore, millions of workers unemployed
' Scc Bean, La~ard. Xc Nickcll (l~JBG) for an an;ihsis of unemplol'~iienl in various western countries.
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means a huge amount of waste since the productive potential of these people is left
untapped.
So far, we have seen that unemployment is a problem in many countries. We have also
seen that it is a waste and that it affects everyone. But can policy makers do anything
about it? Is there a cure at all for unemployment? Or is it merely something which we must
live with and accept? If it is the case that unemployment is an inevitable element of life,
then there is little point to studying it. But is unemployment inevitable? Or can we do
something about it?
In the past, economic doctrine declared that unernployment, with the possible exception of
frictional unemployment, was something which simply could not occur. The market was
King, and fimctioned in a totally satisfactory manner. However, episodes of mass
unemployment, for example in Great Britain and the USA in the inter-war period, made
people realise that the market was not King and did not function perfectly. So if it is the
case that the market does not fimction perfectly, what can we do to improve the situation?
Should we replace the market with some other system? Or should we perhaps introduce
some mechanism to make the market function more efFiciently? These are clearly
important questions. In this tliesis, we hope to provide an answer to some of these
questions.
Whilst we seek to reduce unemployment, it is clear tliat we do not want to do this at any
cost. However, it may be the case that unemployment reduction does in fact have costs
associated with it. For example, if we attempt to reduce unemployment by offering
unemployed workers places on labour-market programmes (to be defined shortly) and this
leads to a reduction in regular employment, we may be cautious about using this policy. Is
there any point in reducing unemployment if we also reduce regular employment and
possibly the total level of production within the economy? Furthermore, it may well be the
case that the ofier to an unemployed worker of a place on a programme may well make
that worker more-aggressive when involved in wage bargaining which itself can possibly
lead to higher unemployment. Thus it is important to be aware of possible detrimental
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effects of unemployment reduction. These effects must be taken into consideration when
analysing the success or failure of a policy. We i~nore these negative effects at our peril.
Various solutions to unemployment have been advocated. For example, some people call
for a Keynesian-style fiscal expansion as a means of stimulating demand within the
economy which in turn will lead to increased labour demand. Others argue for set-up
grants to be given to new firms so that they can then go on to create new jobs. Cutting
unemployment benefits is a policy which has been on the agenda in recent years, as a
policy of reducing unemployment. If benefits are too high, it is claimed, then it may be the
case that unemployed workers will not be so concerned with searching for a job, or will be
too picky when choosing a job. Subsidies to finns for employing the unemployed,
particularly the long-term unemployed, have been advocated as a means of getting the
unemployed back into work. If the cost of hiring a worker can be reduced to the firm, then
the firm should be more willing to hire an unemployed worker. Yet another possibility for
reducing the level of unemployment within an economy is the possibility of improving the
matching technology which allows workers and tirms to be matched. If this matching can
be improved in some way, perhaps by the computerisation of employment agencies for
example, then the length of time a worker will need to search for a new job can be
reduced.
As can be seen, there are a number of ways to tackle unemployment. Only a few have been
mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Yet another method of alleviating unemployment
which is often proposed, is the method of offering places on labour-market programmes to
workers either already in unemployment, or workers entering unemployment. Since we
will be discussing and analysing the usage of labour-market programmes in this thesis,
now will be a good time to define what exactly they are. Quite simply, labour-market
programmes are those temporary measures which the government uses in an effort to
alleviate unemployment. Thus temporary public employment (often known as relief
employment), training programmes, re-training programmes, etc., would all be considered
as labour-market programmes. The idea behind their usage, is that it is better for a worker
outside of regular employment to be actively involved in some form of activity that will
keep them closely linked to the labour market, than to be unemployed with the possibility
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of somehow becoming detached from the mainstream labour market. We can therefore
think of programmes as maintaining workers as full members of the labour force, rather
than seeing them become partially or even totally inactive in the labour market.
Often it is cited that as soon as the economy moves out of a recession and into the upturn
of the business cycle, labour shortages occur. In view of the fact that unemployment is
usually still very high, this seems a very strange situation. How can it be the case that firms
experience labour shorta~es, whilst the unemployment rate remains high? The answer is
simple: labour is not an homogenous resource. There are many different types of labour.
For example, if there is a sudden increase in demand for cars, whilst employment in the car
manufacturing industry is already at its full-employment level, then labour shortages in this
sector will occur. Car workers cannot immediately be created by taking unemployed
workers from other areas and simply calling them car workers. It takes time for a worker
to adapt to the new demands which will be placed on them. Labour-market programmes
may be able to help in this situation. lf the government sees a current shortage of car
workers, or forecasts such an event, then tliey can initiate labour-market programmes to
facilitate the necessary supply of such workers. Instead of allowing a situation to occur or
persist, the government can put labour-market programmes into operation in an effort to
improve the situation. This is one clear example of how labour-market programmes can be
used.
Now consider a region of an economy where the main local employer, be it an industry or
a single firm, has vanished due to a permanent chan~e in demand. As a result of this shift
in demand, many workers previously employed in the local industry are unemployed.
Further consider that a new type of demand occurs which would best be satisfied by
setting up production in the re~ion currently experiencin~ the loss of its old industry. (This
could occur due to, for example, a natural resource being in abundance in the said region.)
However, despite the fact that this region is the best available place to set up production,
there is a shorta~e of the type of labour required in production. There is a shortage of
labour despite tlie fact that unemployment is rife in this area. What should the government
do in this situation? Should it simply sit back and allow the simultaneous occurrence of
labour shortages and high unemployment to happen? Or should it take an active step
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towards eliminating the two concun~ent problems? The intuition is clear. lf nothing is
done, the situation will persist. However, if labour-market training schemes are
implemented in an appropriate manner, then the somewhat paradoxical situation of labour
shortages coupled with high unemployment, can be, partially if not totally, avoided. Thus
we see that, intuitively, there may be a role for labour-market programmes.
So what are the advantages and disadvantages of using labour-market pro~rammes?
Various positive aspects of programmes are often put forward. First of all, programmes
can help raise output by allowing workers to invest in human capital. With higher human
capital raising the output of a worker, the intuition is obvious. Secondly, programmes are
promoted as a means by which the size of the eftèctive labour force can be maintained. If
search effectiveness and skills can be maintained, then those outside of regular
employment can compete more-eftèctively for regular jobs. Thirdly, labour-market
programmes are put forward as a way of reallocating labour between different areas within
the labour market. Since the labour market is in fact many different labour markets,
programmes are seen as a method of allowing labour to move more freely between the
various parts of the overall labour market, thus helpins to mitigate unemployment.
Programmes also keep people out of open unemployment. Furthermore, programmes may
be able to provide additional production for the economy. Lastly, programmes may be able
to alleviate the moral hazard problem associated with the provision of unemployment
benefits. It may be possible to design programmes as a way of testing the willingness to
work. Thus if we can construct programmes to test whether a portion of the unemployed
are seeking work or not, we can withdraw their benefits should they fail the worktest
implied by the offer of a place on a programme. Those who reject such programmes
would be seen as failing the work test, whilst those wlio accept would be seen as passing.
Whilst the preceding paragraph empliasised the good side of labour-market programmes,
they are not without their problems. For instance, they may encourage more-aggressive
wage bargaining on the part of workers, leading to a reduction in regular employment.
Workers become less-worried about spells outside regular employment and therefore
bargain for higher wages which in turn may lead to increased unemployment. Another
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adverse effect is the possibility of crowding out of regular employment due to reduced
search intensity resulting from programme participation.
Sometimes programmes are directed at workers who have been unemployed for a lengthy
period and have lost skills or no longer have a full chance of gaining a regular job.
Programmes, it is claimed, will transform these workers back into fully productive
workers with the maximum chance of gaining a job. But this is not guaranteed. h may be
the case that programme participation fails to move the worker towards full participation
in the labour market. Furthermore, programmes may be worse than useless in that they
stigmatise a worker. Thus a worker may enter a programme with a certain probability of
gaining a regularjob, only to have that probability reduced due to employers seeing the act
of participation on a labour-market programme as an adverse signal of a worker's ability.
In addition, there may be dead-weight loss arising from, for example, training programmes
since some of those who embark on training may have undergone training in the private
sector if they had not entered a government scheme. Finally, labour-market programmes
may be seen as an alternative to structural change. Should this be the case, they may well
facilitate stn~ctural ossification, leadin~ to a country's decline in international markets.
Thus we see that programmes can display both beneficial and adverse elements.
One countiy which has used labour-market pro~rammes extensively is Sweden. Between
1985 and 1989, active expenditure as a percentage of total labour-market expenditure
amounted to some 70.60~0; for 1990-93, the ti~ure was 55.60~0. The corresponding figures
for Great Britain are 33.So~o and 32.80~0. The average unemployment rate for Sweden was
2.l0~o for the period 1985-89, and 4.30~o for the period 1990-93. For Britain, the average
unemployment rate was 9.60~o for the former period and 8.So~o for the latter. Many
observers2, seeing Sweden's low unemployment figures, have cited labour-market
programmes as one of the reasons behind the low unemployment figures. Many have
further argued that if other countries adopted Swedish-style labour-market programmes,
they too could experience the low levels of unemployment as displayed in Sweden.
Comparing Sweden, an active user of labour-market programmes, with Britain, whose use
of such programmes was far more limited, we can see that Sweden's unemployment
' See La~ard. Nickell. 8r lackman (1991) for example.
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record is far more impressive than Britain's. The following figure shows how UK
unemployment compares with Swedish unemployment between the years 1970 and 1989:





70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 61 82 83 84 65 86 87 88 89
Sourcc: OECD Hislorical Stalislics. I'19o. The scries S~~eden' includes those participating
on labour-markct programmes.
As is clear, Swedish unemploytnent rates were far lower than that of the UK for the period
shown. Even if we consider those on labour-market programmes to be unemployed
(Sweden~`), Swedish unemployment rates still tended to be lower than the UK's. Looking
at the period in the 1980s when UK unemployment reached astronomical levels, Swedish
unetnploytnent was significantly lower, whichever way it was measured. Thus it is not
surprising that many viewed Sweden's success with both envy and curiosity.
So far we have only compared Sweden and the UK. But how did Sweden compare with
other countries? If we compare Sweden with certain other European countries, we see
that Sweden's unemployment record is superior. If we look at which country in Table 1.1
below spends the most on active as opposed to passive labour market measures, it is
Sweden. Obviously it is reasonable to ask whether the two are connected.
' Standardised Unemployment Rales (SURs) arc unc~uployment r:ttcs which have been created by the
International Labour Organisation (!LO) ~~~hich attcmpt to niakc tmcmploymcnt comparisons behveen
various conntrics as accuratc as possible.
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( ~~~ of lahour torce)
I')Ri-R9 199u-9; 19Ri-R9 199(1-9i 1985-R9 1990-91
Belgium 4.3 3.9" 27.7 29.1" 10.3 9.9
Britain 2.3 1.7 33.5 32.8 9.6 8.5
Denmark 5.3 6.3 22.I h 24.7 8.5 10.7
France 2.9 2.8 25.5 31.7 ] 0.1 10.1
Germany ` 2.3 3.2 4 L 8 43.6 6.3 6.7
Italy LS'' 1.6" 44.1 `' 45.5" I 0.6 I 1. I
The Netherlands 3.9 3.2 27.9 33.6 9.5 6.9
Sweden 2.6 4 0 70.6 55.6 2.1 4.2
Total labour-Inarkct espenditurc includcs .ICri~c mcasures, uncmploJmcnt benefits, and carly retirement
for labour-market reasons. n: 1990 ~)2: h: I')8G-R9; c: 19Ri ~)(t is West Gcrmany only whilst 1991-93
inchldes East Gcnnanc: d: 19Ri-RR.
So what caused this low level of unemployment? Was it Sweden's enthusiastic use of
labour-market pro~rammes? Or were there perhaps other mechanisms at work, leading to
an unusually low unemployment rate )v.c u I~i.c other countries? In this thesis, we shall
address a number of these issues, using a theoretical framework. Whilst what follows is
theoretical we do feel that it IS Imp(lriant t0 not lose sight of elnpirical evidence. Indeed,
we do attempt in the simulations undertaken later on to at least attempt to use parameter
values which could be seen as meaningful in terms of reality.
Various empirical analyses of labour-market programmes have been undertaken. There are
micro analyses, which look at the etlèct of programme participation on the individual; and
there are macro analyses, which look at how labour-Inarket programines affect
unemployment and other macro variables. A large number of micro studies have been
undertaken, but they appear to be very varied in tenns of results. Forslund ~ Krueger
(1994) survey a number of Swedish studies and colne to the conclusion that the cost of
organising programmes may outweigh the benefits of such programmes. Calmfors(1994)
looks at programmes in Denmark and also tinds a lack of success in using programmes.
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Torp (1995), however, tinds more-positive results in Norway. But in Norway the use of
programmes has been much smaller in scale than Sweden and has been directed at the
lon~ term unemployed.
There have also been a number of macro studies undertaken, for example, by Layard,
Nickell, c~ Jackman ( I 991). Again, however, the results can hardly be seen as
wholeheartedly supporting the use of programmes. Some results seem to be favourable,
whilst others are less so. Thus we see that there are studies which find that the use of
labour-market programmes have little to offer in the way of beneficial results. Sutiice it to
say that the evidence in support of programmes is, at best, ambiguous.
There are various policy objectives, such as reduced unemployment, increased regular
employment, increased production, etc., which policy makers seek to attain when
implementing programmes. Some policies may have both good and bad aspects with
regard to their outcome. For example, a policy may indeed reduce open unemployment
but may cause some crowding out of regular employment. Whether this is a good or a bad
thing is debatable. Furthennore, what happens to the overall level of production as a result
of these effects? Thus with this type of result, the overall conclusion as to whether the
outcome is positive or ne~ative is ambiguous Only when the effects of programme usage
are positive can we say that the result is unequivocally good. In this thesis, we do consider
the effects on various policy objectives but make no claims as to whether a policy is
successfi~l if there are both positive and negative effects. We consider that to be normative
in approach, and outside the scope of this study.
As mentioned, this thesis looks theoretically at how labour-market programmes can be
used and the possible results of such usage. Our analysis uses matching models as a way of
understanding how labour-market pro~ranunes can be used and what results may be
gained. Matching models have been around for some time now. So what actually is a
matching model? Quite simply, a matching model is a model which takes account of the
fact that the process of a firm and unemployed worker joining together is not something
which just happens immediately. On the contrary; it recognises that the matching of a firm
to a worker can be quite an involved process. The firm searches for a worker, whilst the
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worker searches for a finn. These two agents may meet up very quickly, but the chances
are that they will not. The way in which they eventually come together to form a
"marriage" contradicts any notion of the labour market being a market of instantaneous
transactions. This market is characterised by less-than-full infonnation. It is far from
perfect. The matches which do take place must take place against this background. The
matching technology which is used in a matching model, reflects the fact that a worker
searching for a finn may take time to find that tirm, and rice i~crsu.
So why use matching models? Matching is surely a complex procedure. However, a
matching model helps us to simplify wliat is an otherwise incredibly difficult problem to
analyse. Methods of analysis which take into account all of the vagaries and idiosyncrasies
of the real world are simply not available to us at the present time. So the best we can do
is to use a model which at least partially retlects elements of the real world and accept that
the analysis is neither perfect nor one hundred percent accurate. Whilst it is true that
matching models do abstract t~om the complexities of the real world, they do contain
elements of reality whilst being simple enough for hmm~ .capicirs~ to appreciate. Therefore,
we consider our analysis to be both acceptable and relevant.
Various economists have used matching models in their analyses of the labour market.
Mostly, these analyses have not involved looking at how labour-market programmes can
be used. They have looked at issues such as search strategies, mobility costs, subsidising
search, the level of unemployment benetits, etc. Diamond (1981), for example, looks at
the subject of mobility costs using a matching model. He finds that, within the context of
his model, ef~iciency increases when workers are induced to reject jobs offered to them
with relatively high moving costs. This can be done by increasing unemployment benefits.
Pissarides (1979) uses a matching model to analyse the usage of an employment agency
within a labour market. With a choice of either searching randomly or using the
employment service, he tinds that changes in parameters that make random search a
cheaper method to use, increase the overall rate of job matching, thereby reducing the
level of steady-state employment. However, changes which reduce the costs of using the
employment agency have ambiguous et~ects on the rate of job matchings, and therefore
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the level of steady-state unemployment, because they create a negative externality by
discoura~in~ private search activity.
The above-mentioned works are just two of a number of theoretical works which utilise
matching technology for the purposes of analysing the labour market. However, there is
also an abundance of empirical literature concerning matching in the labour market.
Broersma R, Gautier (1994), for example, have derived a job-creation and job-destruction
series for the Dutch manufacturin~ sector using firm-level data. With this, they then
proceed to analyse the cyclicality ofjob turnover, job flows, etc. Van Ours (1991) also
looks at the Dutch labour market usinJ a matching framework. He undertakes a UV
analysis of the Dutch labour market and comes to the conclusion that the UV curve for the
Netherlands shifted outwards sometime in the late 1960s. From this, he argues that the
Dutch labour market was less efficient at matching jobs with vacancies in the 1970s and
1980s than it was in the 19GOs.
Whilst there is an wealth of empirical líterature on the Dutch labour market within a
matching context, the empirical literature is not limited to analyses of the Netherlands.
Burgess (1994), for example, looks at a matching model of the labour market where there
is competition for jobs between the employed and the unemployed. He hypothesises that
an increase in vacancies makes it more rewarding for an employed worker to involve
themself in on-the job search. Increased search activity of employed workers, however,
means more competition for jobs. This in turn leads to a partial crowding out of the
unemployed from taking vacancies on otier. As a result, the outflow rate from
unemployment to employment ina-eases by less than the rate at which new vacancies are
being filled. Burgess backs this hypothesis up using data on the British labour market.
So far, we have seen that the use of matching models to analyse the labour market is
widespread and involves both theorisin~ and testin~ of hypotheses. But no mention has
been made of the analysis of labour-market programmes using matching models. So is this
study the first attempt at analysing labour-market programmes within a matching
framework? The answer is no. Others have already looked at pro~ramme usage within a
matchinj context. Holmlund 8r. Lindén (1993), for example, analyse the usage of labour-
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market programmes in a matchin~ model with three stocks: regular employment, labour-
market programmes; and unemployment. They find that the best way of usin~ programmes
is to target them at those exitíng from regular employment. In this thesis, we essentially
develop the analysis of Holmlund c4z Lindén by extending their model to take into account
certain idiosyncrasies which exist in the labour market as well as introducing a new
possibility of reducing unemployment.
Another attempt at analysing the usa~e of labour-market programmes within a matching
context is that of Calmfors ~. Lang (1995). They use a matchina model with four possible
states for a person of labour-force a~e to find themself in: regular employment; on a
labour-market programme; in unemployment; or non-participation. In their model, firms
are perfectly competitive in the product market. Labour in each tirm is or~anised by a
firm-specific union which has the monopoly power to set the wage. Dropping out of the
labour force is seen as an irreversible process. It is more likely to happen to those in
unemployment as compared to those in employment. They tind that a policy of targetin~
labour-market programmes at those in unemployment is more likely to reduce wage
pressure and thus further enhance the unemployment-reducin~ effect, rather than a non-
targeted approach.
In this thesis, we analyse the labour market with a variety of matchin~ models, all of which
stem from the model of Holmlund K. Lindén. Whilst we are concerned with reducing the
rate of unemployment, we are also concerned with the possibility of crowding out re~ular
employment. In the next chapter, we examine a policy of "rejectable" labour-market
programmes using a simple model involvinJ three stocks in the labour market: regular
employment; labour-market pro~rammes; and unemployment. We find that by designing a
system where labour-market pro~rammes are designed in such a way that their acceptance
lowers the worker's litètime income, despite the fact that unemployment benefits are
reduced below some minimum socially acceptable level, we are able to crowd in regular
employment from one steady state to the next. Thus unemployment is definitely reduced
without the necessity of a reduced rate of regular employment. On top of this analysis, we
show the possible paths from the initial steady state to the new steady state. We show that
there is a strong likelihood that, bet~~re we reach the new no-crowding-out equilibrium,
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some crowding out may occur. Thus the immediate consequence of introducing rejectable
labour-market programmes along with cutting unemployment benefits below their
minimum level, is to crowd out regular employment. Nowever, this effect is not permanent
and in the long iun, crowding in is the result.
In Chapter 3, we extend our previous model from three to four stocks: regular
employment; labour-market programmes; effective unemployment; and ineffective
unemployment. As can be seen, unemployment is split into two types here. Effective
unemployment refers to that unemployment which is wholly active in the labour market.
Tliese workers participate completely in the labour market, searching actively for a job.
This is in sharp contrast to those in ineffective unemployment who, due to their length of
time in unemployment, have ceased to be full members of the labour market. Their search
intensity is lower than that of their et~èctively unemployed counterparts. Labour-market
programmes can be directed at workers in any of the other stocks. When directed at those
in ineffective unemployment, programmes have the role of rehabilitating these workers
into the effective labour market. When directed at those in the effective labour force,
programmes have the role of preventing workers from exiting into the ineffective labour
force. Thus programmes can be used as either prevention or cure. Following from Chapter
2, we also see whether we can use rejectable labour-market programmes here. The overall
results of Chapter 3 are that the active use of labour-market programmes can either crowd
in or crowd out regular employment. What exactly happens, depends on the parameter
values of the model. When we allow for the possibility that rejectable labour-market
programmes can also be used, we find that sometimes the best policy is a mixture of active
labour-market programmes c~ncl rejectable labour-market programmes which allow
unemployment benefits to a certain group of the unemployed to be cut.
In Chapter 4, we analyse a labour market which has one type of vacancy which can be
filled by either workers who exhibit maximum productive potential and maximum search
intensity when unemployed, or by workers who can either exhibit productivity and~or
search intensity which are less than the afore-mentioned workers. We can think of the first
type of workers as primary workers, wliilst the latter type of workers can be viewed as
secondary workers. If a primary worker exits from tlieir job into unemployment, they will
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not immediately lose their characteristics. That is, they will still exhibit maximum
productivity when in work and have a maximum search intensity. To become a secondary
worker, they rnust first spend some tirne in unemployment. Thus search intensity and
potential productivity in work are dependent upon the duration of unemployment. When
the worker has fallen into the secondary type of unemployment, they can only regain the
characteristics of a primary worker by either taking a job as a secondary type worker, or
by taking a place on a labour-market programme. Thus the action of taking a regular job
or a place on a labour-market programrne can transfonn the worker from a secondary type
worker to a primary type worker. Unlike labour-market programmes in the previous
chapter, we allow here for the possibility that the act of taking a labour-market
prograrnme may fail to transform the wor-ker. We also allow for tliis possibility with regard
to regular jobs as well. The results are rather disappointing. Often, there is crowding out
of the low-productivity jobs which more than offsets the crowding in of high-productivity
jobs, with regard to total production. This can occur even when labour-market
prograrnmes are totally successfirl in transforming workers frorn low-productivity workers
to high-productivity workers.
In this thesis, each chapter is basically a selt-contained chapter. It is not necessary to read
the preceding chapters to gain an understanding of what is going on in a particular
chapter. The main ditlerences between the chapters are as follows. Chapter 2 uses a simple
three-stock model of the labour mar-ket (with regular employment, labour-market
programmes, and unemployment) to analyse a new concept which we have developed
which we call "rejectable" labour-market pro~rammes. This simple model shows how
these programmes can be used and their likely results. The model in Chapter 3, is an
extension of the model in Chapter 2 in that it divides unemployment up into two types:
effective unemploymenr, and inet~èctive unemployment. Effective unempioyment refers to
that unemployment which has a maximum chance of gaining a regular job, whilst
ineffective unemployment refers to that type of unemployment which may have the
possibility of having a less-than-firll chance of gaining a regular job. Essentially, the
rationale behind a worker entering inetïèctive unemployment is that that worker has spent
a given time in efíèctive unemployment. Thus the state which an unemployed worker finds
themself in is dependent upon the duration of unemployment. In Chapter 3, we analyse the
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possibility of using programmes to either prevent workers from entering ineffective
unemployment, or of using programmes to transform workers in ineffective unemployment
into effective workers once more.
Chapter 4 extends the model still fiirther by assuming that both skill loss and reduced
search intensity are both dependent on the duration of unemployment. Furthermore, whilst
there is only one type of vacancy on offer, this vacancy can be filled by either type of
worker but will reflect the difference in terms of productivity of the job. Unlike the
previous chapter, however, places on labour-market programmes can only be offered to
those workers who exhibit reduced search intensity andlor skill loss. Thus the policy here
is one of cure, rather than prevention. A novel innovation in the model used in Chapter 4
is the allowance for the fact that pro~rammes may fail to transform a worker. We assume
that if a worker exhibiting skill loss and~or reduced search intensity enters a regular job,
then this may transform them into a worker with maximum productivity and maximum
search intensity (we also allow for the possibility that it may not). Thus it may well be the
case that if we place a worker on a programme which is poorly designed and fails to
transform the said worker, we may actually be perpetuatin~ the length of time which that
worker spends as a secondary worker. Thus in this chapter, there exists motivation for
designing programmes correctly.
The overall conclusion of this thesis, is that labour-market programmes are not necessarily
a miracle cure for unemployment. As seen above, programmes have both positive and
negative effects, so perhaps this result is not too surprising. We have included positive
features, as well as negative features. In all chapters, there is the positive feature of
directly reducing unemployment by using programmes. In Chapter 3, we also have
programmes transfonning workers, who have become less likely to gain a regular job,
back into workers with a maximum chance of gaining a regular job. Chapter 3 also allows
for the fact that programmes may prevent workers from becoming less likely to find a
regular job by reducing or eliminating their chances of losing search intensity. In Chapter
4, we further have the positive feature of programmes transforming workers from less-
productive to fully productive workers. As for negative features of programmes, all
chapters include the possibility that programmes lead to hi~her wages which, indirectly,
Introduction 17
increases unemployment. In Chapter 4, as mentioned, we also allow for the possibility that
labour-market programmes may fail in their aim to transfonn workers from less-
productive workers with a lower chance of gaining a regular job, to fully productive
workers witli maximum search intensity.
Cahnfors (1995) warns that "the available empirical evidence warns heavily against
expecting too much". Whilst it is possible that programmes can crowd in regular
employment at the expense of unemployment, this is seldom guaranteed. Only when using
labour-market programmes as illustrated in Chapter 2 ( i.e. rejectable programmes) can we
guarantee that the usage of labour-market programmes will crowd in regular employment.
But if this is indeed the case, why bother at all to use labour-market programmes except
when they are designed to be rejected? Is it not too much of a risk to implement labour-
market programmes? These questions are certainly poignant. However, in reply to them,
we argue that to merely limit ourselves to using rejectable labour-market programmes
would deprive ourselves of the possibility of reaching a better result. After all, who would
thank us for achieving a sub-optimal solution?
Chapter 2
Should We Offer the LTnemployed Places on Labour-Market
Programmes With the Intention That They Reject Them?
Absh.act
In this chapter, we analyse the usage of labour-market programmes using a matching
model with three stocks - re;ular employment, labour-market programmes, and
unemployment. With the assumptions that a welfare safety net must be in place and that
pay on labour-market pro~rammes must be at, or above, some minimum social level, we
find that often tlie optimal policy for reducin~ unemployment in this model is to offer
unemployed workers places on "rejectable" labour-market pro~rammes whilst
simuhaneously lowering the level of unemployment benefits, possibly to zero.
("Rejectable" labour-market programmes are simply those programmes which are
unacceptable to workers in that the expected lifetime income from remaining unemployed
is hi~her than that of being on a programme.) The unemployed worker will thus still have
a safety net in place, since the pro~ramme place offers a wage above the minimum level,
but will reject it in favour of unemployment. This usage of labour-market programmes is
the only usage which is guaranteed free ofcrowdin~-out problems.
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2.1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been much debate on whether labour-market programmes can be
used to combat unemployment, and tlieir likely impact'. Various models have been
developed to analyse the likely etfects of such programmes on unemployment and the
possibility of crowding out of regular employment. All of these models assume that if an
unemployed individual is offered a place on a pro~ramme, they will accept it since it
increases expectecl lifetime income. The general result of many of these models is that
labour-market programmes can reduce total unemployment but are likely to crowd out
regular employment. Tliese models also implicitly assume that benefits cannot be reduced
below some minimum level unless a place on a programme is guaranteed. Thus it is
assumed that the unemployed will liave some welfare safety net to be able to fall back on,
rather than being thrown into the rava~es of destitution.
In this chapter, we use a matching model in the tradition of Diamond (1981), Mortensen
(1982), Pissarides (1985, 1990), and Holmlund cec Lindén (1993). The major difference
between this chapter and the aforementioned papers is that we allow for the possibility of
offering placements on laboiu--market programmes which are unacceptable to the
unemployed worker, in that the lifetime value to the worker of being unemployed is higher
than if the said worker was on a labour-market programme. We refer to these programmes
as "rejectable" labour-market programmes. (Note that it is always beneficial to the worker
to accept a regular job.) This allows us to cut unemployment benefits and offer places on
labour-market programmes which are rejected in favour of remaining unemployed.
Since it is the unemployed who have the highest search intensity amongst those who are
searching, due to having the time available to search, they have the highest chance of
gaining a regular job. Thus a worker may prefer to be unemployed since they will have a
higher chance of gaining a regular job. Due to the higher chance of~aining a regular job, it
is possible that a worker in unemployment will have a higher expected lifetime income
than if that worker were on a labour-market programme. Thus the value of being
unemployed can be higher than the value of being on a programme. If we can construct a
' See. for e~ample. Calmfors Xc Lang (1'1~~i), Holnilund Xc Lindén ( I l9,). Jackman (199~). Laiyard,
Nickell, crk J~ick~uan (1991). Millcr (19~J I). ,~nd Millcr (199i).
Rejectable Labour-Market Programmes 21
situation where it is in the interest of the worker to remain unemployed, despite lower
unemployment benefits than previously (possibly no benetits whatsoever), then we can
crowd in re~ular employment since the reduction in unemployment benefits will reduce the
waJe costs to finns and therefore lower the cost of maintaining a vacancy. Due to the
lower cost of maintaining a vacancy, the number of vacancies will increase which will lead
to more matches taking place between firms and workers. Thus we can gain a result where
we have crowded in re~ular employment at the expense of cmemployment, without
removin~ the welfare safety net.
But couldn't we just implement a policy where we announce that unemployment benefits
will be cut in the future? Surely, this would have the same effect as sug;ested? The
problem with this policy, is that it is not time-consistent. Individual workers would see
that if they did not prepare for the tliture reduction in unemployment benefits, the
~overnment would be forced to otlèr them benetits in the event of unemployment.
Furthermore, merely cuttin~ unemployment benefits at a future date would not be in
keeping with the assumption of a welfare safety net being in place.
In this chapter, we assume that those workers on labour-market programmes are strictly
less productive than those in regular employment. Thus, any crowding out of regular
employment due to the usa~e of labour-market programmes must be viewed with some
caution. Also in this chapter, we endogenise the payroll tax to make our analysis more
complete. Wliilst the endogenisatíon of the payroll tax does not affect the comparative
statics of the model, it does allow us to see if the resultin~ situation is socially acceptable
in that all members of the labour force are receivin~ a wa~e, or entitled to benefits, at or
above some minimum level. Should this not be the case, then we consider the situation to
be unworkable. For example, if we simply cut unemployment benefits to below the
minimum social level without providing a guarantee of a place on a labour-market
programme with pay at or above the minimum level, then the situation would be
considered socially unacceptable and therefore unworkable. The worker in unemployment
would not have the protection of a welfare safety net, which is considered to be an
essential element of any socíally acceptable system. This would be despite the fact that the
comparative statics would show an all-round improvement.
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This chapter takes the following format: Firstly we develop our model, making the
assumptions and framework explicit; then in Section 2.3, we show how we have
endogenised the payroll tax, and the motivation behind doing so; in Section 2.4 we look at
the comparative statics of the model; in Section 2.5, we undertake some simulations of
examples of the usa;e of labour-market programmes both for the rejectable and the
"acceptable" (i.e. those labour-market programmes which do increase the present value of
a worker's lifetime income) cases and show the results; in Section 2.6 we provide a
conclusion to the steady-state analysis in this chapter; then in Section 2.7, we .introduce
some discussion on the possible paths between the steady states; in Sections 2.8 and 2.9
we undertake some simulations of possible paths between the steady states; Section 2.10
provides a conclusion to the dynamic analysis, and Section 2.11 provides an overall
conclusion to this chapter.
2.2 The model
In this chapter, we use a matching model where the search process is summarised by an
aggregate matching fiinction H- h~.í', b'~, where .í' is the number of searchers and lI is the
number ofvacancies. H is increasin~ in both its arguments and exhibits constant returns to
scale. The number of searchers is given as the number of unemployed plus the effective
number of searchers on IaUour-market programmes, i.e. S-11 f cR , where U and R are
the number of unemployed and the number of workers on programmes, respectively.
Search effectiveness is captured Uy the parameter c, where 0 ~ c ~ 1. Since being on a
programme is a fiill-time activity, programme participants search less intensively than the
unemployed. Notice in this model that all unemployed workers exhibit the same search
intensity. Thus we do not allow for the possibility that the unemployed may lower their
search intensity with duration of unemployment5. We further assume that those in regular
employment (f~~ do not search.
There are L individuals in the exogenously given labour 1'orce. The proportions of the
workforce in regular employment, on labour-market programmes, and in unemployment
` Later in this thesis. we do allo~~ for this possibiliiy. Here. howevcr, we use this very simple model to
illustrate how rejectable programmes can be used.
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are given as c- L~L , r - R~1. , and rr - f I~L , respectively. Since the labour force
comprises of those in regular employment, those on programmes, and those in
unemployment, we have the following identity: 1- c t r f ar . The vacancy rate is given as
v- V~I , The variable B- V~.ti' represents labour-market tightness. The higher is B, the
tighter is the labour market. q- H~V represents the rate at which vacant jobs are filled.
By the constant returns to scale assumption, we have q(B~ - h(.S~V ,1~ - h(l~B,l~ , where
g'(B~ ~ 0. The flow of new hires into regular jobs is given as H- aS, where
a-(H~V~(V~S~ - q(B~B. We see that a'(B~ ~ 0 since a- Bh(1~8,1~; thus a - h(1,8~ ,
where h(.~ is an increasing function.
Regular job offers arrive according to a Poisson process, with arrival rates that are
exogenous to the individual worker. The arrival rate for an unemployed worker is a,
whilst for a programme participant it is ca . Therefore, the arrival rate is higher for an
unemployed searcher than for a programme participant, providing those on programmes
search less intensively than those in unemployment (i.e. if c ~ 1). The unemployed may
also exit to programmes. Oftèrs of places on programmes arrive according to a Poisson
process with parameter y. There is an exogenously given rate ~ at which regular jobs
break up, and a government-determined rate ~, at which programmes expire. A worker
separated from a regular job can enter onto a labour-market programme with probability
,u , or enter directly into unemployment with probability (1- ,u~ . Programmes are
considered to be temporary. Thus we assume that the rate at which programmes expire is









In Figure 2.1, the boxes L, R, and ll, refer to the stocks of re~ular employment,
programme participants, and unemployment, respectively, whilst the arrows represent the
flows between the stocks. In the steady state, the numbers flowing into a given stock equal
the numbers flowing out of the said stock. Thus we have the following steady-state
equations for rates ofregular employment and pro'ramme participation:
[ 1] ~c: - a~B~rr f ca~H~~l - c- n~
[2] [ca~B~ f~]~1 - e- rr~ - yrr f frr,ic
(From the identity l- e t r t rr , we let r - I- ~- rr in the equations.)
Equations [1] and [2] determine rr and ~, given B. In order to detennine B, we have to
consider the detennination of vacancies and wages. All regular jobs are equally
productive. We assume that firms are srnall. Eacli firm has only one job which is either
occupied or vacant. For the firm, an occupied job has an expected value of Jo if the
worker- entered from a programme, and .I if the worker entered from unemployment.
The expected value of a vacant job is .I,,. The discount rate is denoted by 8, y is the
constant marginal product, iv~. is the wage cost to the firm of a worker who entered the
job from a pro~ramme, w~ is the wage cost to the firm of a worker who entered the job
from unemployment, and k is the cost of maintaining a vacancy. The wage rate is related
to the wage cost via the identity 1N~, - W~ ~~ (1 t t~ , where t is the payroll tax. In this
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chapter, we treat the payroll tax as endogenous. How we do this will be explained in detail
in Section 2.4. J„ , J„ , and J„ satisfy the following equations:
[3] c~l - y - ia~ f Q~~J,, - J,,, ~
[4J ~! ~„ - J' - i~~ „ } ~(J,. - ,I ,,, ~
[5] c~l,. - -k f q,~J„ - J„~ t d„(J~„ -,I,.~
L7' ll
where q,. - a- and y„ - a-.
r n
A job occupied by a worker who entered the wage bargain from a programme yields a
per-period surplus of y- i~~~. and is turned into a vacant job at the rate ~; worker
separations from this job are associated with a capital loss of ,l,, - J~ . A job occupied by
a worker who entered the wa~e bargain ti~om unemployment, on the other hand, yields a
per-period surplus of y- ~~~,x and is turned into a vacant job at the rate ~; worker
separations from this job are associated with a capital loss of .I,. - J„ . The cost of a
vacancy per period is k, and vacancies become occupied at the rate d, by workers from
programmes and q„ by workers fi-om unemployment. Vacancies are kept open as long as
their yield is positive. In equilibriwn, due to the small tirm assumption, J„ - 0. The value
of a job occupied by a worker who entered fi-om a programme is obtained from [3] as
J~ -~y -,,~~., ),(ó t~~ , whilst the value of a job occupied by a worker who entered from
unemployment is obtained from [4J as J-(y - i~~~. ),(ó t~~ . Substituting into [5]
yields
[6] y - i,~ . - k
8 t ~ q(B~
where ir~~. -~In,~~, f cn,~~. ~,(11 f cr~ is the average wage cost in the economy, and
q(B~ - q~ f q„ - a((crf ll~~i~~ is the finn's average probability of finding a worker to fill
a vacancy.
This is the average zero-profit condition for firms. The left-hand side is the average
present value of profits per worker, whilst the right-hand side is the expected present
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value of the firm's hiring cost. Labour-market tightness influences decisions on vacancies
by affecting hiring costs: the tighter the labow- market, the costlier it is to hire due to the
longer duration of vacancies.
Wages are determined by a Nasli bargain. The tirm's disagreement point is the value of a
vacant job; whilst the worker's tllreat point is either the expected lifetime value of being
unemployed, if the worker is unemployed, or the expected lifetime value of being on a
labour-market programme, should the worker be on a programme. Since we assume that
the wage bargains are undertaken between individual firms and individual workers, there
are essentially two types of Nash bargain in the economy. This is in sharp contrast to
Holrnlund c~ Lindén who ignore the role of workers who have entered regular
employment trom labour-market programmes.
We let n,, and n,, denote expected discounted lifetime income for workers in regular
employment who have entered theirjob from a programme and workers who have entered
their job from unemployment, respectively. n„ denotes the value ofunemployment, whilst
n, denotes the value ofbein~, on a programme. The value functions can be written as
[~] vn,. - ~~~,. f (I - F,)~(n„ - n ,, ) ~ ~,~(n, -
[s] hn~, - ~~~,, t (1- ~,)~(n„ - n,,,, ) f ~~q~n~ - n
[~] ón, - p,.,,- ~ ~a(n,,, - n, ) t ~(n„ - n, )
[lo] an„ - P,,,,, ~ a(n,, - n„) t y(n, - n„)
where n,, -(1~cS)f ,~~, f(I - f~)~i(n„ - n,, ) f,u~(n, - n~, )] is the value to the worker of
a job anywhere ` in the economy which was entered from a programme, whilst
n,, -(I~S)[N~„ f(I - f~)Q~(n„ - n,, ) f ~~qi(n, - n,, )] is the value of a job anywhere in
the economy which was entered from unemployment. i~~, and i~~„ refer to the wages of
workers in regular employment who entered the job from a programme and
unemployment respectively, whilst u~ refers to the average wage in the economy. A worker
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employed by firm i receives the wage rate rv, if they entered the job from a programme,
and i~~„ if they entered the job from cmemployment. All workers are separated from their
job at the rate ~. A worker exiting from their job has probability p of entering a
programme and probability (1 - ti) of entering unemployment. Pay on programmes is
linked to the average wage in the economy via the replacement ratio p„ whilst
unemployment benefits are linked to tlie average wage in the economy via the replacement
ratio p„ .
The Nash bargain between a programme participant and the firm solves the following:
i~ ~-a
InaX ~(N~~)-~A ~11 ~-11~~ ~.~ (IN~)-.~,,~
1 `'n ~
where 0 ~~i ~ 1.
The outcome of the Nash bargain is a wage equation of the form
[llj N~~,-y-II~~ J(Iti)(cSf~i)~A~~,.-Ar)
where the equilibrLium conditions ~~~, - i~~, and .1,. - 0 are imposed. For these workers,
the outside option, should the wage bargain not result in employment, is the value of being
on a programme, i.e. A,,. As can be seen, any policy that reduces the value difference,
A,,, - A„ will increase in,
The Nash bargain between an unemployed worker and the tirm solves the following:
i~ ~-a
max~ S2(iv,,;~-~A,,;('"'„~-A„~ ~~~,,;("'~,;~-.I,,~,
where 0 ~~3 ~ 1.
The outcome of the Nash bargain is a wage equation of the form
~12~ '''~,, -y-[1 ~QJ(1-~~)(b~~)(n,,, -n„~
where the equilibriwn conditions ii~„ - ~i~„ and .1,, - 0 are imposed For these workers,
the outside option, should the wage bargain not result in employment, is the value of
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unemployment, i.e. n,,. Again, any policy that reduces the difference in value between
working and the outside option, n,, - n,,, will increase the wage cost w~~ .
We can combine these two wage equations to gain a wage-cost equation for the average
wage in the economy. By weighting ~,~, by the proportion of searchers on programmes
and ii~„ by the proportion of searchers in unemployment, we gain the following average
wage-cost equation:
in~~ , f ci~~~~ I - ~313] ia~. - " -y ~ ~(b f ~)(I f ~)(n,, - n~,,)i~ f cr
where





n,, refers to the average value of being in regular employment, whilst n~,, is simply the
average outside option available to workers involved in wage bargaining. In [14], n~ is
weighted by the proportion of effective searcliers who are on programmes. This is due to
the fact that, in the steady state, the proportion of workers who enter regular employment
from programmes is equal to the proportion of effective searchers who are programme
participants. Similar reasoning holds for the weighting of n,, .
We can re-write the average difference in value between regular employment and the fall-
back situation as n,, - n,h -.f(.)i~~ (see Appendix). Substituting this into [ 13] and using
[6] to eliminate y gives us the following equilibrium average wage equation:
~k
[ 16] ~~~~ -
(1 - Q)4(e).f [a(e): ...~
This equation determines the wage cost, given tightness. By expressing Ae - n~ as the
average wage multiplied by .f (.) , we are able to gain an explicit expression for w~ in
terms of Q, k, q(B) , p,, p„ , and the flow parameters of the model (see Appendix for
further details). Note that a is the only flow parameter which is a function of B.
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Our model is now more or less complete; in the next section, we complete the model by
makin~ the bud~et constraint explicit. By seeing whether the system can provide all
workers with the guarantee of benefits or a wa~e at or above the social minimum, we can
see whether the system is workable or not.
The almost-complete model is given by the wage equation [ 16], the zero-profit condition
[6], and the two steady-state equations [ 1] and [2]. [6] and [ 16] determine B and w~ . By
substitutin~ B into [1] and [2], we can determine 11 and e.
The model is illustrated in Figure 2.2, below. The top half shows the zero-profit condition
[6] and the wage equation [ 16] in ~i~~~ , B~ - space. The bottom half shows the "Beveridge







Alternatively, we can show the model with the c- B curve, instead of the Beveridge
curve, as shown in Figure 2.3 below. The e-B curve is simply the relationship between
regular employment and tightness. [t is obtained by substitutin~ out n from [1] and [2]. It







From Figures 2.2 and 2.3, it can be seen that the wage-setting curve slopes upwards. We
can see from [I6] that B appears in the denominator in both q and the value difference. As
B increases, both q and .f ~.~ (which is positively related to the value difference) fall; the
result being that the average wage cost increases. The zero-profit condition on the other
hand is negatively sloped. The reason for this is that the higher the average wage, the
lower must be labour-market tightness in order to yield zero profits (see Page 25).
The only curve which is unaffected by changes in any of the policy parameters is the zero-
profit condition in the top half of the diagrams. Changes in either of the replacement ratios
are reflected in a shift in the wage-settin~ curve, only. All other curves remain fixed. Thus
a change in a replacement ratio results in a movement along the zero-profit curve, and
thus movements along both the Beveridge cuive and the c- B curve. A change in a policy
parameter which directly affects the stocks in the labour market shifts the wage-setting
curve as well as the Beveridge curve and the c- B curve. An increase in the flow onto
labour-market programmes causes the Beveridge curve and the c- 6 curve to shift
inwards towards the origin, and vice-versa.
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As mentioned, whilst we are now in a position to see how the model looks, and what
happens if cu~ves shift in a particular direction, we are unable to see if the resulting
equilibrium is able to otier all workers, whether workin~ or not, the guarantee of either a
wage at or above the minimum acceptable level, or benefits at or above the minimum
acceptable level. The next section, therefore, shows how we have endogenised the payroll
tax and how this allows us to see whether the resulting situation is workable or not.
2.3 Endogenis~tion of the p~yroll tax
In this chapter, we endogenise the payroll tax. Whilst a change in the payroll tax does not
alter unemployment, or even regular employment, it is still necessary to look at the payroll
tax for other purposes. Primarily it is necessary to endogenise the payroll tax in order to
check to see if the situation is workable, in that the outcome is socially acceptable. What
this means is that the system is able to provide all workers outside of regular employment
with the option of either takin~ unemployment benefits or pay on a labour-market
programme at or above the minimum IeveL (In an extreme situation, it may even be
possible that workers in regular employment have a wa~e below the required minimum!)
We assume that in the steady state, government revenue from the payroll tax equals
expenditure on both unemployment benetits and pay to those on labour-market
programmes. Thus we have n~~r - p, i~~r f p„ u~~i . Simplitication of this leaves us with the
following expression for the payroll tax in the steady state:
[17~ ~ - P,.r
t p„ii
c
From [16], we see that ~o~ - ~3k,[(1 - Q~~~~9~~~a~B~;...~~1 t t~]. Thus any increase in 1 will
reduce the waje, possibly to below the minimum IeveL (Note that we are discussing the
wage which the worker receives as opposed to the wage cost.) This itself, would ensure
that the system is unworkable. As is clear, ~ is likely to increase should either p,, r, p,,,
or i~ increase or if c decreases. If any of these chan~es either reduces i~~ to below the
minimum level, or the welfare safety net when not working (i.e. p,i~~ when places on
labour-market programmes are guaranteed to unemployed workers but their
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unemployment benefits are below the minimum level; or p„w when no programmes are
available or when programmes are directed at the flow out of regular employment) to
below tlie minimum level, then we consicier the system to be an unworkable system.
Our model is now complete. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show the salient features of the model,
whilst the endogenisation of the payroll tax allows us to then check to see if an equilibrium
is a workable equilibrium or not. The next section looks at the comparative statics of the
model. This allows us to make predictions as to the likely direction of change in wages, as
well as the rates of regular employment, programme participation, and unemployment.
2.4 Comparative staticsG
The direct etiect on unemployment of a change in either y or ,u is i~Y ~ 0 and n„ ~ 0,
respectively. In Figtu-e 22, this would be seen as an upward shift of the Beveridge curve.
Thus for a given value of B, unemployment will be lower. However, a change in a policy
parameter will also have an indirect wage etïèct on unemployment. This effect will alter
the value of B. As I(E~ ~ 0, we would ideally like B to increase as a result of the change in
the policy parameter. Thus in Fi~ure 2.2, we would prefer to see the wage curve shift
downwards, resulting in an increase in B. From [ I G], we see that any policy that increases
f~.~ reduces the wage cost. This has the effect of increasing 6. Therefore, we see that a
change in a policy parameter influences the wage (and B) according to the following
relationship:
c39 c3~~ c~,.
sign (-I)-- sign ` - si~n (-I)-
c~ c~ c~
where x is a policy parameter. Policies which have a negative indirect effect on
unemployment reinforce the direct negative effect on unemployment.
Since the value diftèrence between re~ular employment and the fall-back position is
reduced when we increase p„, it is clear that c~`~c'p„ ~ 0. Thus, ifwe can reduce pu, we
can increase .~ (~~ and thereby reduce the wage cost to firms. This in turn will increase the
~ Calculalions cau bc sccn in Appcndix A of Ihis chapler.
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value of B thus leading to an increased flow into re~ular employment. If we increase p, ,
the value difl'erence between regular employment and the average fall-back situation can
either increase, decrease, or remain unchanged, depending on how programmes are
targeted. Thus we have ~~`~~?p, ~0.
If we increase the proportion of those exiting regular employment who enter labour-
market programmes, this can either increase, decrease, or leave unaltered, the value
diftèrence bet~veen regular employment and the average fall-back position. The reason for
this is that whilst aiming programmes at the flow out of re~ular employment increases the
value of regular employment to a greater extent than the value of being in unemployment,
it also increases the value of bein~ outsicle regular employment for some since it makes
them programme participants with a higher present value of lifetime income. Thus we have
~`'~r?,er~0. As a result, B can either increase, decrease, or remain unchanged with a
chan~e in ~~ .
Seeking to increase the number of unemployed workers entering labour-market
programmes, i.e. ina-easing y, has the etlect of increasing the present value of being in
unemployment to a greater extent tlian the increase in the present value of regular
etnployment. Coupled with this the fact that there are now more searchers on programmes
than previously, and thus with hi~her present values, it is clear that the value diftèrence
between regular employment and the avera~e fall-back position will decrease. Thus we
have ~Íj`~r~y~0. As a result, B will certainly decrease when pro~ramme places are
targeted at the unemployed.
With regard to regular employment, wc tind that the direct effect of an increase of the
flow onto pro~rammes is negative, i.e. we have ~~, ~ 0 and ef, ~ 0. This, coupled with the
fact that e„ ~ 0 and that an increase in programme participation may in fact reduce B,
implies that the usa~e of pro~rammes is extremely likely to crowd out regular
employment.
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The only policy which crowds in re~ular employment thereby reducin~ unemployment is
the policy of reducin~ unemployment benefits. Whilst there is no direct effect on the
labour-market stocks, i.e. ~~~r?p„I~~-~~ - 0 and c~i~cpul N-~~ - 0, the indirect effect of a
reduction in unemployment benefits on unemployment is unequivocally negative, and the
indirect effect on regular employment is unequivocally positive, i.e. ~~~~~9~~~~9~óp~ ~ ~ 0
and ~d~~~~~~~9~~p„~ ~ 0. So what stops us from using such a policy? Other papers have
implicitly assumed that the level of benefits is already at its minimum level. If we consider
benetits to be at their minimum level, the only way we can reduce them is to guarantee
programmes to those who lose such benetits. Yet by now using such programmes, we run
the risk of crowdin~ out regular employment.
2.5 How to crowd in regul:~r eniployment by using I:ibour-market programmes
As we have seen, the usa~e of labour-market programmes is extremely likely to crowd out
re~ular employment. So if using pro`~rammes is almost certain to crowd out regular
employment, wouldn't it be undesirable to use them? Maybe; maybe not. Whilst so far the
picture with regard to the possibility of crowding out has been grim, there is a way in
which we can use labour-market pro~rammes and crowd in regular employment. One
thing is absolutely clear in the model: by reducing unemployment benefits we can reduce
unemployment and increase re~ular employment. So why don't we simply reduce
unemployment benefits? An obvious reason for not reducin~ unemployment benefits is
that they may already be at their minimum level Since we have assumed that workers
must have the availability of a welfare safety net when outside regular employment, we
must consider the reduction of such benefits with caution. But couldn't we offer
unemployed workers places on programmes with a rate of pay at or above the minimum
level which are designed to give the worker a lower expected present value of lifetime
income than if the worker were in unemployment, despite the fact that unemployment
benefits are lower or possibly zero'? By ~uaranteeing an unemployed worker a place on a
prograimne, but ensuring that the said job is rejectable, we can cut unemployment benefits
to below their minimum level unc! avoid the crowdin~ out associated with the usage of
pro~rammes. The welfare safety net is still in place, but the unemployed worker declines it
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in favour of remaining unemployed with unemployment benetits below the minimum level.
ln fact, an unemployed wor-ker may opt to remain unemployed with no benefits
whatsoever, despite the fact that they are guaranteed a place on a programme!
How can this be so? Since an unemployed worker has a higher chance ofgaining a regular
job than a worker on a pro~ramme (providing that c~l), it may be in the interest of the
worker to remain unernployed, foregoing earnings from programme participation, to
maintain a maximum chance of gaining a regular job. The worker can thus achieve the
highest expected lifetime income by remaining unemployed, and waiting until a regular job
is obtained, despite the fact that unemployment benefits may be well below the socially
acceptable minimum.
Essentially the result of this policy is two-fold: Firstly, the reduction in unemployment
benefits increases the value dit~èrence between regular employment and unemployment,
thus leading to a lower wa~e cost to tirms. Lower wage costs induce firms to create more
vacancies. As a result, 9 increases which in turn causes a, the flow into regular
employment, to increase. Secondly, it avoids unemployed workers, with a maximum
search intensity, from entering pro~rammes where the search intensity is very likely to be
lower (i.e., when c ~ 1), due to havin~ less time to search than if they remained in
unemployment. Since the worker would rather be unemployed than on a programme,
providing the lifetime income of bein~ unemployed is higher than if they took a place on a
programme, they choose unemployment so that they are able to search full-time for
regular employment.
Despite the fact that the policy solution which we offer has unequivocal results, it is
enlightening to look at examples of such usage, particularly in relation to the use of
programmes where the intention is that they be accepted, i.e. "acceptable" programmes.
The following table shows some simulations undertaken which show the contrast between
using rejectable and acceptable labour market pro~rammes. The parameter values which
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In Table 2.1, the base nln describes the initial situation when labour-market programmes
are not available and the level of unemployment benefits is already at the minimum
possible level. We consider this Ininimuln level to be the absolute level of unemployment
benetits in the base run. The second column from the right, "A~'ll", indicates whether
programmes are acceptable ( indicated by A) or rejectable (indicated by R). The column on
the far right indicates whether the system is workable or not ( a tick indicates yes; a cross
indicates no). By workability, we refer to whether the system can maintain a welfare safety
net at or above the Ininimum level (here, the safety net which was in force in the base run).
This is where the endogenisation of the payroll tax comes into force. By using the
definition of the payroll tax, we can see whether the system can support the welfare safety
net required. Table 2.1 shows us tlie average wage (as opposed to the wage cost) which
the worker receives in regular elnployment. As is clearly seen, this wage is reduced by an
increase in the payroll tax. In one case, the wage is itself reduced below the minimum level
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of absolute benefit required in the base run! The following table shows us why, and if, the
system is workable:
Table 2.2
Y f~ P„ P. P„"' P,"' "~„~~:,(,i~~ .,ailt A~ A, A~
f3ase nin 0.0 0 0.5 - i0.1) - r - 77A71G.5 - 775103.4
c-0 O.í 0 0.0 LU U.0 7.0 x f( iilll.2 5501G.5 55002.4
c-0 0.0 0 o.(I o.49 0.0 50.0 r ~ 786313.8 773724.1 781418.8
c-0.i 0.5 0 0.11 O.il U.11 i(1,0 r A 7617~1.4 757114.1 757103.3
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As shown, acceptability may be just too expensive to maintain. For example, when c- 0
and labour-market programmes are targeted at the unemployed (row 2, Tables 2.1 and
2.2), we find that acceptability requires that the average wage that the worker in regular
employment receives falls heavily due to the need to finance labour-market programmes.
In fact, it falls far below the minimum level of benefits required! When c- 0 and we
target programmes at the tlow out of regular employment, we must still maintain
unemployment benefits at or above the minimum absolute level since we are not
guaranteeing unemployed workers a place on a projramme. However, to do so requires a
high replacement ratio for those on pro~rammes which itself reduces regular employment
(which, as can be seen from Table 2.1, has already been crowded out as a result of this
policy) still further.
In our simulations the only time when using acceptable pro~rammes works, i.e. fails to
crowd out regular employment, is when c- I. But in the simulation when ~~ - 1, the value
functions for both being on a programme and being in unemployment are the same value.
Using the benefit ofdoubt, we have allowed this to be considered as a usage of acceptable
programmes. But to really be certain of this we really require an explicit form for the
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worker's utility function. So this situation must be considered doubtful. In any case,
c- 1.0 is an extreme example and does not appear to be indicative of the real world.
In the simulations where acceptability ofprogrammes holds and where c ~ 1, we see from
Table 2.1 that some crowding out of re;ular employment results. The extreme case is the
simulation illustrated in row 2 of Tables 2.1 and 2.2. The re~ular employment rate is
reduced from 950~o to a mere 6.6o~a. As can be seen, this situation is unworkable. In row 4
of Tables 2.1 and 2.2, we see the result of a simulation where c - 0.5 and acceptability
holds. Here, the regular employment rate has fallen from 95oro to 93.6o~0. Not a substantial
level of crowding out, but crowding out nonetheless. When we guarantee places on
programmes to those flowin~ out of re~ular employment ( rows 7, 8, and 9, in Tables 2.1
and 2.2), we see that when c. ~ I and acceptability holds, crowding out is again the result.
Looking at the present value of expected lifetime income of being either employed in a
regular job, on a programme, or in unemployment, in Table 2.2, we see that the only time
when lifetime income rises substantially as a result of a policy change is when the resulting
situation includes rejectable labour-market programmes. This is in stark contrast to
situations where c ~ 1 and acceptability holds: lifetime income falls for all groups.
2.G Conclusion to the steady-sto-ite an,~lysis
As can be seen, the only usage of labour-market programmes which enables us to crowd
in regular employment in this model, is that of rejectable labour-market programmes. By
offering unemployed workers programmes which they reject in favour of remaining
unemployed, on reduced benefits due to their refusal of an offer of a place on a
programme, we are able to shift the wage-setting curve downwards resulting in an
increase of the tlow into regular employment. Despite the fact that we now offer workers
unemployment benefits below the minimum level, the welfare safety net is still in place.
Workers do not have to face the prospect of poverty. Workers, seeing that it is in their
interest to remain (or become) unemployed, rather than to join a labour-market
programme, will take the appropriate action when employed and plan for any possible
periods when unemployed. Indeed, both the rejectable programme solutions increase the
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expected lifetime income of those in unemployment in comparison to those in
unemployment in the base run. Furthermore, the rejectable programme solutions also
increase the lifetime incomes of those in regular employment in comparison to those in
regular employment in the base run (see Table 2.2 for details).
Whether a policy like this could actually be implemented, is something which needs to be
considered. Whilst it is true that this policy works within the context given here, it may
well be the case tliat there exist other considerations outside this model, which could
render the policy either unworkable or undesirable.
Thus our conclusion of the steady-state analysis is that the only method of programme
usage which leads to a crowding in of regular employment, is that usage which itself is
dormant but allows for a tightening of the unemployment benefit system. This tightening
of the unemployment benefit system is the only way to crowd in regular employment. To
guarantee a crowding in of regular employment, labour-market programmes must be used
in such a way that their direct etïect on employment and unemployment is non-operational
and only their quasi-indirect et~èct, through reducing unemployment benefits, is
operational.
2.7 Possible paths between the steady st;ites
So far, we have only considered the case of workers who are not liquidity-constrained,
and thus are able to perfectly adjust their behaviour to totally avoid entering a labour-
market programme. Thus we have undertaken a steady-state analysis of the use of
rejectable programmes, assumed that workers can perfectly adjust their behaviour, and
have ignored what happens between the steady states. When looking at the use of
acceptable programmes, any analysis of what happens between the steady states is not
really necessary, since the adjustment which takes place occurs smoothly. But what
happens when rejectable programmes are used? For instance, what will happen if workers
are offered places on rejectable programmes, but are unable to afford not to take them? In
this section, we show possible paths between the steady states.
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In the previous analysis, we assumed that c, the search intensity of participants on labour-
market programmes as a fraction of tlie search intensity of the unemployed, was
something given exogenously. Thus c was not considered to be a policy variable.
However, it is reasonable to think of c as being a partial policy variable in that the
government is able to influence the amount of search undertaken by a programme
participant by designing the programme accordingly. However, we do not believe that c
can be adjusted so accurately as to achieve a precise value. The optimal value of c is that
value which is low enough to allow unemployment benefits to be cut to zero, but enables
the transition from the initial steady state to the new steady state to occur as quickly as
possible.
First of all, we assume that workers require the minimum level of income (defined
previously) on whicli to live. In the steady-state analysis already undertaken, we assumed
that the minimum level was the level of unemployment benetits available in the base run.
Therefore, if we now introduce rejectable labour-market programmes and simultaneously
cut unemployment benefits to below the minimum level, workers must still find the
minimum level on which to live. Tliat is, workers must receive the minimum level on
which to live for each period. A worker cannot exist on nothing. In the previous analysis,
how the worker fiinded themself if they rejected a place on a labour-market programme
was ignored. Here, we look at a few possible situations'.
2.8 A situation where the unemployed hwe no savings but st~rt to swe immediately
upon the implementation of rejectable labour-market progranunes.
In our first example, we consider a situation where workers initially have no savings,
relying totally on the unemployment benefit system for periods outside of regular
employment. We further assume here that there exists no credit market for workers
wishing to fund periods of unemployment. We consider workers to be risk averse.
' The simulations ~~e undertakc are quite rough and ready in approach. However, the intuition which is
achieved allows us to see whc~hcr any crowding out will occur bctwecn the steady states. Detaits of how
the resulls were achicvcd are given in Appcndix B of lhis chapter.
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Immediately on implementation of the new policy of offering rejectable labour-market
programmes in conjunction with reduced unemployment benefits, workers in regular
employment will begin to save in preparation for a spell in unemployment whilst those
already in unemployment will be forced to take places on programmes since they are
liquidity-constrained. We assume that those in regular employment will save all income
over and above the minimum level. Initially, then, the flow into labour-market programmes
will be quite hi~h, since all of those in unemployment who fail to gain a regular job will
necessarily take a place on a programme. However, as time progresses, workers will be
able to maintain their time in unemployment for longer periods since they will have
prepared themselves for unemployment whilst in rejular employment.
We undertake one simulation with the above-mentioned assumptions, where we set
c- 0.45. This value is low enough to allow unemployment benefits to be cut to zero and
labour-market programmes to be ofiered, whidi of~èr income at the minimum level, but
rejected. The following graphs illustrate what happens to regular employment,
unemployment, and y the flow into labour-market programmes from unemployment.
"I,
Figure 2.4: Regular employment between the steady states
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Figure 2.5: Participation on labour-market pro~rammes between the steady states
0
I.
Figure 2.6: Unemployment between the steady states
Figure 2.7: The flow into labour-market programmes between the steady states
As can be seen from Figure 2.4, regular employment increases immediately when
rejectable labour-market programmes are introduced since the flow into regular
employment increases due to the value difference between being in regular employment
and outside, increases. We have simulated the path here in such a way, that those in
unemployment who are unable to gain re~ular employment on the first day enter labour-
market programmes at the end of the day. This explains why some crowding in occurs
initially. However, at the end of the first day there is some flow into labour-market
programmes. Soon, there occurs crowding out. This is in stark contrast to what the
steady-state analysis shows. However, eventually the labour market adjusts and crowding
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in occurs. Obviously it is best ifwe can choose a value ofc which allows the adjustment to
occur as quickly as possible.
Looking at the rate of participation on labour-market programmes, we see that initially
there is a large number of workers on pro~rammes. When c- 0.45, we see that at the end
of the first day the rate of programme participation is high, due to those in unemployment
having little choice but to enter a programme. However, after the first day, the rate of
programme participation declines. This is due to the fact that, despite new arrivals entering
programmes, the flow out of programmes and into regular employment is higher than the
inflow from unemployment. However, there could be values of c where the outflow from
projrammes into regular employment remains lower than the inflow from unemployment.
Thus the proportion of the labour force in programmes increases until the outflow exceeds
the inflow. Thus the intensity of crowding out and the length of time during which
crowding out occurs will vaiy dependin; on the value of c. A lower value of c will
increase the inflow into regular employment from both labour-market programmes and
unemployment since the value difference between being in regular employment and being
outside regular employment will become larger (since between steady states some
proportion of the labour force will be participating in labour-market programmes).
However, working in the opposite direction is the fact that if c is low enough, those in
labour-market programmes will have difticulty exiting into regular employment.
In Figure 2.6, we see what happens to unemployment. In the initial steady state, the
unemployment rate is So~o. But as soon as rejectable labour-market programmes are
introduced, the unemployment rate drops to almost zero. Then gradually over time it
approaches its new steady-state value trom below. The path is similar for both the values
of c which we have used. The important point to note, however, is that the drastic drop in
unemployment upon the initiation of rejectable labour-market programmes is short-lived.
The new steady-state value, whilst lower than the old steady-state value, is not as low as
the rate of unemployment after one day of the new policy.
Lastly, in Figure 2.7, we see what happens to y the flow from unemployment to labour-
market programmes. On the first day, the flow is very high. Those in unemployment who
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are unable to tind a regular job are forced to enter a programme. However, the next day
no one enters a programme. This is because the new entrants into unemployment, i.e. the
only people in unemployment since all of the old unemployed have either entered a
programme or have gained a regular job, are able to avoid immediately entering a
programme since they have had a limited time to prepare for unemployment. They thus
avoid entering a programme until the second day of their unemployment spell. Thus y
takes a positive value on the tliird day between the steady states. Similar reasoning holds
for the days that follow. As time goes on, the value of y falls to a very small value due to
all workers in regular employment being aware that they have to prepare for spells of
unemployment.
All in all, the important thin~ to note about this example is that it shows that there is a
possibility of crowding out before crowdin~ in occurs. Also, it gives further justification
for using rejectable labour-market pro~rammes in that, in the period between the steady
states, they may actually be used as an instrument in the transition of the labour market
from one steady state to the next. Furthermore, the fact that the value of c will affect the
length of the transitional period between the steady states as well as the severity of
crowding out provides further justification for designing labour-market programmes
correctly.
2.9 A situation where the unempluyed h:we savings :~nd do not need to enter I~bour-
market p~rogrammes
In thís, our second example, we look at a situation where those in both regular
employment and unemployment have savings sufficient to fund their periods of
unemployment. As is very clear, if we now introduce rejectable labour-market
programmes whilst at the same time cut the level of unemployment benefits, the immediate
effect is to increase the flow into regular employment to the new steady-state value. Since
both those in unemployment as well as those in regular employment have sufficient funds
to avoid entering a programme, which will reduce the present value of lifetime income,
there is no flow into labour-market programmes. Thus y- 0. Because there is no flow
into labour-market programmes, there is no crowding out between the steady states. All
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that happens, is that crowding in occurs immediately and continues up to and until the new
steady-state equilibrium is reached. We can see what happens in the following figures:
Fi~ure 2.8: The path of regular employment
95 ~
Figure 2.9: The path of unemployment
`~a I
2.10 Conclusion to the o-inalysis of what happens between the steady states
The moral of this story ís that, in the transitional period between the initial steady state and
the new steady state, crowding out of re~ular employment may occur. Whether this is in
fact the case or not depends on whether workers are liquidity constrained or otherwise.
We have shown two different situations: one with crowding out; one with crowding in.
The importance of this result lies in the fàct that should policy makers implement a policy
of rejectable labour-market programmes with the intention that regular employment be
crowded in, and then observe crowciing out, they may make a U-turn in policy. However,
if they were aware that some crowdin~ out is a possibility before crowding in occurs, they
may be able to make a more rational judgement. Thus if policy makers could see that
crowdin~ out was in certain circumstances a necessary part of crowding in, they would
not be so alarmed when it occurs.
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The other important point of this analysis lies in the fact that if c can be adjusted to reduce
the length of the period during which crowding out occurs, then there is some further
justitication in how labour-market programmes should be designed. c affects the flows
between the stocks in two ways. Firstly, c aftècts the flow into regular employment
directly in that should a worker find themself on a labour-market programme, then the
value of c will atiect their chance of gaining a regular job. However, providing there are
workers on labour-market programmes ( such as in the immediately preceding analysis),
then the value of c also affects the value difïèrence in the wage equationg which itself
affects a , the flow into regular employment. Note that in the no-crowding-out case, it
does not matter what value c takes, as long as it implies that A„ ~ A, .
2.11 Over~ll conclusion to this chapter
The overall conclusion to this chapter is that rejectable labour-market programmes can be
successtully used as a means of crowding in regular employment thereby reducing
unemployment. However, it may well be the case that, before the new steady state is
reached where crowding in is the result, crowding out may occur in the meantime. Thus it
may be the case that a no-crowdin~ out equilibrium actually requires crowding out.
s c does not affect wage bargainiug in the nci~ stcad~ staie since no one accepts a place on a labour-iuarket
programme.
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2.12 Appendix A
From equations ( 1) and (2), and the identity 1- c f r t ii , we gain the following steady-
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These differentials refer to the direct effect of a policy change, i.e. the effect of a policy
change on regular employment when B is fixed. Notice that p„ does not appear in the
steady-state value of regular employment. Thus the direct effect of a change in pu on
regular employment is zero, i.e. ~
~P„
-p
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éB











Difierentiating [A2] with respect to a, we gain the following:
c~r ~ j ,y f ( N)~} ' ' ( f ) ( f ~ )~
~--y,,`c l~- 1- fc-a- I- ~ t~cat i f~. ~0
Since a'(B) ~ 0, this implies that ~~ ~ 0
~
We find the average value diftèrence between regular employment and the fall-back
position as follows:
~,n t ~~,.n
[A4] n~. - n,h - -„„f~~.
[AS]
[A6] n,, - n,h - n,, -
,~n„ t~rn,
t,tcr
-~,) f a](n,, - n„) t ~~(y f~,a)(n~-. - n-~
catcyf~
t~n -t-crn i~ (n -n „)fcr(n -n,)
ii t cr ii f cr
We invoke the following equations:
(~) hn, -,~,,. t(1-~,)~(n„-n~.,,)tf~~~n.
(s) hn , - ~~~ , ~- (1- ~,)~(n„ -
(9) an, - p~N' } ~~a(n~. - n, ) } ~(n.. - n~)
(lo) anL - pu,,, t a(n,, - n„) f y(n, - n„)
Invoking the equilibrium condition that u~,. - u~, and 17~„ - 1N,,, and subtracting (8) from
(7) yields the following:
„~, -,,,,, - (h } ~)(n~, - n~~„ )
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Subtracting (12) from ( 1 1) yields the following:
(11)-(12)~ [n~] ,,,,-„~W -~1-Ql(a't~)~(n~. -nu~-(ne, -n,)~
QJ
Together these imply the following:
n~,, -n ~,,, -(I-Q)n, t(1-~3)n~ -0
The identity which gives us the average present value to the worker of being in regular
employment ( 14) implies the following:
[A8] (ca t cy f~)A~, - c(y t f~a)n~, -~ca(l -,u) t ~~n~ - 0
Using [A7], [AS], and the following equations
(b t Q,)n~, -„~ t(1 - f~)~n u f f~~n,
(b t ca t~.)n, - p,i,~ f can~, -E- ~n~,
(dtafY)n„ -P~,u~fan~-„ }Yn,
allows us to find explicit expressions for A,, - n„ and n~, - n,, .
Welet n~. -n„ - Y.~~' and n~, -n, -~.i~~,
where
P-(BtQ,)r-,u~a(cafcyt~.)h(1-c)taQ,~c(yta~3)tóf~~
r- ca{ca(1- ~~) f~}(1- ~)(d t a) t.i{(c.~a t cy t~)y - ca(y f,ua)(1 - Q)}




`~ - P,c~(y -~ f~a)(8 f y f aI3) t P, (d f y)Q,~c.a(1- fr) t.i~
-- - ~'a~PH~~ca(1- fi) t ~~ t ~P„ (ca t cy f~)- ac~(y f f~a)(P, - cP„ )
N- P,(ca t cy f.1)y t c~a~3~~(y t f~a)P,. t{ca(l - f~) f~}Pu ]- ca(Y t fJa)P,
f(S f.1)p„(ca f cy t~) f capHc(y t~~cx)
~ - -ca~~ca(I - ,u) f ~ ~P„ (I - ~3) t (d t c.a t ~)P„~(ca f cy -~ ,{)
- p, {ac~(y f~~a) - y~(ca f c.y t.i)1
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M- Q,~ca~l - f~~ t~~~~c~a~ t~. t bt y t~l - c.~~a~ t c~y t f~a~ó~b f y t a~3 f~.~
t~1- ft~~rS~i~ca t cy t~~~P„ - P, ~
-~ ~r~py.c~~y f fta)~6 t y t a~~ t{f~r ~~ t y~ } a~pr - cpu ~ t ca~ipi~ }~[ca~l - fx~ t ~., t ~lpu~~ca t cy t~~J
And since we have n~, - n,h -,f Oi~~, we thus have the following:
,r~ ~-~ca~l - f~~ t.ï~L tc~y t fra~M
- ~ca t cy t.~~P
2.13 Appendiix B
Here we show how we undertook simulations of the paths between the steady states. The
important thing to note about these simulations is that they are rough simulations and we
make no claims that they are perfect representations ofactual paths. What they do actually
show, however, is the approximate paths which may occur.
The simulation where crowdin~ out of regular employment occurred was undertaken as
follows.
The model was set up as if the first day between the steady states was itself a new steady
state. Thus we set 1- a t y, i.e. all workers already in unemployment will either exit into
regular employment or take a place on a pro~ramme. We then found the value of alpha
from this simulation and assumed that alpha takes this value whilst between the steady
states. This value of alpha overestimates the tnie value of alpha and thus underestimates
the true degree of crowdinJ out of regular employment. Having gained this value of alpha,
we calculated the following:
DaY 1:
c, -~1- ~~e„ t an„ t car„
ii, -~~~t~l-a-y~l~~~~
r, -~1- ca~r~~ t Y ~~~~~
Y~ -~1-a~
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In day 1, none of tlie unemployed have been able to save anything, so they must either exit
into regular employment or take a place on a labour-market programme. So at the end of
the first day, the only people in unemployment are those who entered during the day from
regular employment.
DaY Z:
e, -~1-~~ei far~i fcari
rrz - ~:~ t~l-a-y:~rr~
r, -~1-ca~r, ty,x,
y, -0
Here, in the second day, there is no flow onto labour-market programmes since those
workers who entered unemployment on the previous day were able to save enough to
maintain one day of unemployment before having to take a place on a labour-market
programme on the following day.
Dav;:
c; -~1-~~e, faii, ~-car,
rr, -4x, f~l-a-y;~r~,
r, -~1-ca~i~, fy,n,
Ys -I ~' I~1-a),
` r~; J
On day 3, those who entered unemployment on day 1, i.e. Qx,, and have failed to exit into
regular employment, will have to take a place on a programme. Thus gamma equals the
flow into unemployment on day 1 multiplied by the square of ~1- a~ to represent those
who have been unsuccessful in gaining a regular job, divided by the number in
unemployment on day 3.
D~4:
e, -~] -~~e, f arr, f car,




Thus for odd days we have the followin~:
Day t (where ~ is odd~
c, -~1-~~e,-~ tati,-~ tcar,-,
i~, -~,-~ t~l-a-y~~~~~-~
r~r -~l-ca~r,-~ } y~a,-~
~,-~ ,.~
Y, - ' ~I-a~~~i,
Whilst for even days we have:
Day~( where [ is evenZ
c, -~1-Q~~e,-~ tat~,-~ fcar,-~
i~, -qx,-, f~l-a-y,~n,-~
r, -~1 -ca~r,-~ fy,r~,-~
Y~-O
Simulatin~ day-by-day for the paths between tlie steady states, in the above manner, then
allows us to gain a rough idea as to what happens between the steady states with the
assumptions which have been made.
Chapter 3
Do Labour-Market Programmes Necessarily Crowd Out Regular
Employment? - A Matching-Model Analysis.
Abstract
It is often claimed that the usage of labour-market programmes will necessarily crowd out
regular employment. As a result, it could be argued that, despite their probable negative
impact on unemployment, the overall benefits of using labour-market programmes may in
fact be dubious. In this chapter, we show that the usage of labour-market programmes
need not necessarily crowd out regular employment. On the contrary; we find that there is
the possibility of crowding in regular employment, thereby reducing total unemployment.




Looking at Europe today, it is difficult to believe that for over two decades immediately
following the end of the Second World War, full employment was the norm for most
countries in Europe. That situation, however, seems to be something which most people
merely regard as a memory, since full employment seems to be as extinct as the dodo.
Nowadays, many workers appear to be trapped in a never-ending prison sentence of long-
term unemployment with the sight of remission a distance prospect. For example, the
unemployment rate in Britain in 1983 stood at 12.40~0 of the labour force, whilst 36.20~0 of
those in unemployment had been unemployed for 12 months or over. In 1993, the total
unemployment rate in Britain had declined to 10.20~0 of the labour force, but the
proportion of unemployed who had been out of work for twelve months or more had
increased to 43.10~9. Moreover, according to Jackman 8z Layard (] 99 I), the proportion of
those unemployed for less than three months exiting into regular employment was
approximately 350~0. However, for those unemployed for around one year, and over two
years, the corresponding figures were around 200~0, and 70~0, respectively. Thus those in
long-term unemployment have little chance of escape into regular employment. But is this
situation a necessity? Or can we avoid the cost of long-term unemployment altogether?
Whilst many people advocate using labour-market programmes as a means of combating
unemployment, there are strong theoretical reasons (often supported by empirical
evidence) for being wary of such a proposal. Two principal reasons are put forward for
not using labour-market programmes. Firstly, it is often argued that by using labour-
market programmes this leads to more-aggressive wage bargaining on the part of workers.
This is due to their fall-back position, when failing to reach a wage agreement with
employers, being higher. Programmes mean that workers are less concerned with the
possibility of spending time as searchers. This argument against labour-market
programmes is certainly worth considering since there exists a possibility that labour-
market programmes may actually increase overall unemployment.
A second reason for being cautious about using labour-market programmes, is the
possibility of crowding out regular employment. As an extreme case, what is the point of
9 Source of 1983 data: Millcr (1991); source of 1993 data: OECD (1995).
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putting a person on a labour-market programme if all this does is prevent the said worker
from gaining a regular job? Since it is regular employment which is regarded as the most
productive form of employment, any possibility of crowding out must be viewed as an
argument against the usage of labour-market programmes.
But are the two argtnnents put forward against the application of labour-market
programmes enough to prevent us from advocating their usage? Can there ever be a
situation where the usage of labour-market programmes crowds in regular employment
thus reducing the proportion of the labour force outside of regular employment? In this
chapter, we use a matchin~ model of the labour market to analyse these issues.
Our model includes four possible situations for a worker to find themself in: regular
employment; on a labour-market programme; eftèctive unemployment; and ineffective
unemployment. Notice that we divide unemployment into two categories. By efiective
unemployment, we refer to those unemployed workers who search full-time for work. Of
those searching, these unemployed workers have the highest possible chance of gaining a
regular job. Inefïective unemployment, on the other hand, refers to those unemployed
workers who do not search fiill-time. This is due to them almost giving up hope of gaining
a job, due to the length of time which they have already been unemployed. Having failed
to gain a job so far, they see little point in searching as intensively as previously.
Furthermore, search costs money and it may well be the case that those who have been
unemployed for any length oftime will have less funds with which to search for ajob. As a
result, these workers are less likely to gain regular employment This distinction is strongly
motivated by empirical evidence which shows that the long-term unemployed have less
chance of exiting from unemployment into regular employment than the short-term
unemployed. Thus we see strong reasons for dividing unemployment, as described.
In our model, labour-market programmes can be given to workers flowing out of regular
employment, workers in eftèctive unemployment, andlor workers in ineffective
unemployment. We can interpret the offer of a place on a labour-market programme to
those in effective unemployment and to tliose exiting from regular employment as a means
of preventing those workers from entering inetïective unemployment. On the other hand,
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we can view the offer of places on labour-market programmes to those in ineffective
unemployment as a cure for this type of unemployment. Thus there is, to an extent, a
dichotomy between prevention and cure in this model. Furthermore, within the model, we
can also vary the level of unemployment benefits paid to those in unemployment as well as
the level ofpay to those on labour-market programmes. We find that we are able to crowd
in regular employment and thus reduce total unemployment by either directing labour-
market programmes at the flow out of regular employment, directing labour-market
programmes at effective unemployment, or directing programmes at the ineffective
unemployed. This success, however, depends on the parameters of the model. These
policies can be reinforced by reducing the level of unemployment benefits. Thus when we
use labour-market pro~rammes, we propose that active labour-market policy is
strengthened whilst at the same time passive labour-market policy is weakened.
This chapter takes the following format: Firstly, we develop our model, making the
assumptions and framework explicit; then we look at how the endogenisation of the
payroll tax in our model enriches our analysis; next we look at the comparative statics of
the model; in Section 3.4, we look at some examples of using labour-market programmes
and the results obtained; in Section ~.5, we conclude this chapter.
3.2 Tlie model
In this chapter, we analyse the usage of labour-market programmes as a means of
combating unemployment using a matching model of the labour market. This model
follows on from the model in the previous chapter. However, we have divided
unemployment into two types - et~èctive unemployment, and inefïèctive unemployment.
The division of unemployment into the two types specified is strongly motivated by the
current situation in many economies where a significant proportion of those in
unemployment are long-term unemployed. With regard to the wage-bargaining process
and how (and why) ours differs from Holmlund c~ Lindén's, see Miller (1995) for a full
discussion. Essentially, we take into consideration, not just those in unemployment, but
those on labour-market programmes as well, when wage bargaining takes place. In
addition to the two changes mentioned, we also endogenise the payroll tax on wages into
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the model. This allows us to see whether a specific usage of labour-market programmes is
able to maintain a welfare safety net for all workers. How this is done is explained towards
the end of this section.
We assume throughout this chapter that benefits cannot be reduced below some minimum
level unless tlie ofier of a place on a labour-market pro~ramme is guaranteed. On top of
this, we assume that any offèr of a place on a labour-market programme must be at a wage
which is at or above the minimum acceptable level. Thus we assume that those outside
regular employment will have some welfare safety net in place; and, that any ofier of a
place on a labour-market programme, whether to those leaving regular employment, or to
those in efPective or inefïèctive unemployment, involves a wage at or above the minimum
level. We further assume that those on labour-market programmes are strictly less
productive than those in regular employment.
In this chapter, the matching of workers to jobs is not instantaneous; on the contrary, it is
both costly and time-consumin~. The matchin~ process is described by an ag~regate
matching function N- h~.S,G'~, where .S' is the number of searchers, and V is the number
of vacancies. This matchin~ function exhibits constant returns to scale and is increasin~ in
both its arguments.
Searchers in the labour force include those who are not in regular employment. These can
be those in imemployment, or those on labour-market programmes. In this chapter, we
divide unemployment into two types: effective unemployment; and, inefiective
unemployment. Those workers who are in eftèctive unemployment are those unemployed
workers who search fiill-time. These workers participate fully in the labour force and, with
respect to other searchers, have the hi~hest cliance of gainin~ a rejular job. They have not
been unemployed for such a long time as to almost give up hope of ever gaininá a regular
job. Thus they see search activity as bein~ worthwhile. Inefiective unemployment, on the
other hand, refers to those unemployed workers who, due to the duration of their
unemployment, may regard themselves as having less chance of ~ainin~ a regular job.
Thus they may search less intensively than tlieir counterparts in effective unemployment.
Those on labour-market programmes may search less intensively than those in effective
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unemployment, but for a ditierent reason. Since they are engaged in some form of activity
whilst on a labour-market programme, it may be the case that they have less time to search
for regular employment.
The number of searchers is thus equal to the number of effective unemployed, the number
of effective searchers in ineffective unemployment, plus the number of effective searchers
on labour-market programmes. Thus we have the identity .S' - EU f cR f,~~I(I , where EZI
is the number of workers in et1'ective unemployment, Il is the number of workers on
labour-market programmes, and IU is the number of workers in ineffective unemployment.
c and ~;~ refer to the search effectiveness of those on labour-market programmes and in
ineffèctive unemployment, respectively. c can take any value between, and including, zero
and one, whilst ~; can take any value greater than zero but less than or equal to one. c can
be greater than, equal to, or less than g. Taking a value of one indicates that that category
of worker searches full-time Thus those in effective unemployment search full-time. We
assume that those in regular employment do not search.
We assume that the size of the labour force (L) is tixed. There are no flows either into or
out of the labour force. The labour force comprises of regular employment (E), those on
labour-market programmes, effective unemployment, and ineffective unemployment, i.e.
L- E f R f EII f Ill . Dividin~ each stock by the labour force, ~ives us the proportion of
the labour force in the stock concerned. Thus e - E~I„ i. - R~L, eii - ECI~L and
iir - I(~~L refer to the proportion of the labour force in regular employment, on a labour-
market programme, in etïective unemployment and in ineftèctive unemployment,
respectively. Total unemployment is defined as (I - IïU f IU ; thus the rate of total
unemployment in the economy is n- rr~ f in . Similarly, we denote the vacancy rate as
i~ - V~L . We let 9 - Y'~S represent labour-market tightness. An increase in B denotes an
increase in labour-market tightness, and vice-versa. We introduce q- H~V to represent
the rate at which vacant jobs are tilled Due to the constant returns to scale assumption,
we have q~B~ - h~,S~V,I~ - h~1~B,1~, where q'~B~ ~ 0. The flow of new hires into regular
employment is given as H - a.S', where a -~H~V~~6'~.5~ - q~B~B. From the constant
returns to scale assumption, we see that a~6~ is increasing in its argument.
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As H- aS - a~E11 t cR t ~IU~ , it is straightforward to see that
c~ - H~V - a L;II~V ~ ca R~V f~a Il1~V . The terms a EU~V , ca It~V , and gaIII~V
refer to the rates at which a vacant job is filled by a worker in Ei'I, R, and I[I,
respectively"'. It is clear that the lower is c, the lower is the chance of a vacancy being
filled by a worker on a labour-market programme. A similar argument holds for g with
respect to the rate at which a vacancy will be filled by a worker in ineffective
unemployment.
We assume that regular job offers arrive according to a Poisson process. The arrival rate
for a worker in L'll is a, whilst for a worker in Il and III it is ca and ga , respectively.
We can see clearly that if either c ~ I or ,ti;~ ~ 1, then the arrival rate for a worker in R or a
worker in Ill is lower than for a worker in LU, respectively. Whether the arrival rate of a
regular job offer is higher or lower for a worker in R as compared to IU depends on
whether c is greater than g or not.
Regular jobs break up at the exogenously given rate, ~. Placements on labour-market
programmes break up at the government-determined rate, ~. Since we consider
placements on labour-market programmes to be temporary in this paper, we assume that
~. ~~, i.e. that placements on labour-market programmes break up at a faster rate than do
regular jobs. We assume that .í is also bounded from above since labour-market
programmes can be used to rehabilitate those in I(I back into the effective labour force. If
the length of time spent on a labour-market programme were too short, this would render
the ability of labour-market programmes to reinstate ineffective workers as effective
workers void. Thus rehabilitation is a process rather than an immediate transformation.
A worker will find themself in one of four possible labour force states: regular
employment; on a labour-market programme; effective unemployment; or ineffective
unemployment. A diagrammatic representation of our model is given in Figure 3.1, below.
"' Thus we can think of y- y~ti } qr } qr~~ ,
where yct~ - a E(I~V refers to the rate of filling a
vacancy with a worker Gom EU, whilst q, - ca R~V and c~,~, - Ra IU~V refer to the rates of filling
a job with a~~orkcr from R or IU, respccli~cl~.
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As can be seen, a worker in regular employment cannot directly enter inettèctive
unemployment but must first spend some time in effective unemployment before tlowing
into ineffective unemployment. Thus the search intensity of an unemployed worker is
duration-dependent. From R, a worker is able to flow into either E or EII but unable to
flow into I11. Thus we consider that the very act of being placed on a labour-market
programme maintains the worker as a fully effective member of the labour force if they
have entered R from either E or E11, or transforms the worker from an ineffective to an
effective member of the labour force if the worker has entered R from III. We do not
allow for the possibility that a worker could exit from Il into Ill. Thus labour-market
programmes are considered to always be successful in that their success rate at
maintaining a worker as an effective worker, or transforming an ineffective worker into an
effective worker, is one hundred percent. Provided that c and g are both less than one,








For a steady-state equilibrium, we require that the flow(s) into a stock equal the flows out
of a stock. Thus we have the following equations:
[1] Q~ -a~eufcrf~iu~
[2] (ca f ~.~r - ~iQr f yerr f ~ciii
[3] ~a f y t yi~eri -~1- ft~~ t.i.r
[4] ~,~~a t ~r~i~i - yien
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[We also have the identity 1- e t r f c rr f irr .]
The above equations detertnine the stocks as proportions of the total labour force, given
B. (Note that a depends on B.) To obtain the value of B, we tnust look at how wages
and vacancies are detertnined. Essentially there are two sides to the wage bargain: the
finn's side; and the worker's. We shall first look at the finn's side of the bargain.
For the tirm, a(I regular jobs are equally productive. We assume that firms are small. Each
firtn has only one job which is eitlier occupied or vacant. We denote the expected present
value to the tirm of an occupied job as either J~, , J~ , or J~ , depending on whether the
job was taken by a worker in Ell, It, or Ill, respectively. J„ , J , and J~, satisfy the
following equations:
[5] ~SI ,,, - J' - r~~ ,,, ~ ~~J,. - .l, ~
[6] ~l - y - w~ f Q,~J,. -,1,, ~
[~] `~1,,, - J' - ti~ ,,, } ~~J,. - J ,;,, ~
where b represents the discount rate, and ~~ represents the constant marginal product of
an employed worker. The wage rate is related to the wage cost by the following identity:
N~ - t~~~ ~l f t~, where 1 is the payroll tax rate, and ,j- err, r, irr . Taxes are required to
finance labour-market pro~rammes and unemployment benefits". The expected value to
the finn of a vacant job is denoted as J,. , and satisfies the following equation:
[gl dl,. - -k t q~~~~J~, - J,,~
where k represents the cost of maintainin~ a vacancy, and
[9]'~ tSl„ - y- u~~ f rb~.l,, - J„~
where J„ represents the average expected value of an occupied job and the average wage
cost i~~~, is defined as
c rni~ .,, t cv.ri~ . f ~~nn.i~ ,,,
err t cr t ~;irr
~~ In this chapter, we ~tsswuc lhat. in the sle;id~ slale. the revenue which tlie government receives from
thcse tascs equals thc pa~ ments to thosc on labour-m.ukct programmes and those in unemployment. Thus
we assume a balauced budgct. This ~~ill be scen c.~plicith later in this section.
~'- We can also dcfine J~~ as Jr, -(errJ~, i t crJ~~, t,~iuJ~~ir ),~eu t cr. t,Lirr~ .
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As can be seen from [9], the average occupied job yields a per-period surplus of y-w~
and is turned into a vacant job at the rate ~. The cost of maintaining a vacancy per period
is k, whilst the probability of turning a vacancy into an occupied job is q(B~ . A firm will
keep a vacancy open as long as it yields a positive profit. In equilibrium, due to the small
firm assumption, we have . 1,, - 0. Substituting this value into [9] we obtain
,I~ -(y-N~~.~~(8f ~~. Substituting this into [8], we obtain the following equation:
y - i,~~. k
[11] -
8 t ~ q(6~
This is the average zero-profit condition for firms. The left-hand side of [11] is the
expected present value of profits per worker whilst the right-hand side is the expected
present value of the firm's hiring cost. As can be seen clearly, labour-market tightness
affects the firm's decisions on vacancies since the tighter the labour market the more
costly it is to hire a worker due to the longer duration of a vacancy.
Having discussed the tirm's side of the wage bargain, we shall now discuss the worker's
side of the bargain before making the bargaining scheme explicit. A worker can find
themself either employed in a regular job, participating on a labour-market programme, in
effective unemployment, or in ineffective unemployment. If a worker enters regular
employment from a labour-market programme, they will receive the wage w, . Whilst if
they enter from effective unemployment or ineftèctive unemployment, they will receive
w,,, or ii~,,, , respectively.
We let A~ , A,, A,,~,, and A,,, represent the expected discounted lifetime value for;
workers in regular employment, on labour-market programmes, in effective
unemployment, and in ineffective unemployment, respectively. The j subscript on A~ ,
which can be either en, r, or i~i, refers to whether regular employment was entered from
efiective unemployment, a labour-market programme, or ineffective unemployment,
respectively. Tlie value functions are given as follows:
[12] cSA,,,-ii~~~,fN~(A,-A-.,,~f(1-N~~( n~,,,-n~.,,,)
[ 13] SA~. - i,~, f f~Qi(A, - A~, ) f(I - f~~~~A,,,, -
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[l4] dn -i,~~~,}N~(n,-n~,,~~}(1-N)~ln~,,,-n~,,.)
[IS] bn, -P,.wfca(n,, -n,)f~(n~~-n,)
[16J dn~,u-P~„w-f-a~A,, -n,u)ty(n,-n~~)tyr(A;L-A~u~
[ 17] dn;~, - P;,,w t~a(n.;,. - n,,,) t n(n, - n;~~
As we can see, the rate of pay in labour-market programmes is linked to the average wage
in regular employment, i~~, via the replacement ratio p, , whilst unemployment benefits in
EII and unemployment benefits in Ill are linked to the average wage in regular
employment via p~„ and p;,, , respectively. All replacement ratios lie between zero and
one. The model exhibits incentive compatibility in that the value from holding a regularjob
is always higher than the value of being in one of the other sítuations. Thus it is assumed
that policy makers will always set replacement ratios and other policy parameters such that
holding a regular job is the optimal position for a worker. Therefore workers will prefer a
regularjob to a placement on a labour-market programme, or unemployment.
We assume tliat all workers are protected by a safety net in that should they be
unemployed, they will be entitled to unemployment benefits andlor an offer of a placement
on a labour-market programme. If we direct labour-market programmes at those flowing
out of regular employment and~or those in et~ective unemployment, then we require
n, ~ n,,,, to Ilold. Notice that if we direct labour-market programmes at those in I(I, then
we no longer require that n,. ~ n,,,, holds; only that n,. ~ n,,, .
The Nash bargain between a worker and an employer solves the following
max , S2,(„~~)-~n, -n,]''[.I,;("',)-J,,~'-~
o~Q~l
where s- e~i, in, r. Thus n,,u, n,,,, and n„ are the fall-back positions for workers in
Ell, Ill, and R, respectively, should they not gain a regularjob. The outcome of this Nash
bargain is a wage equation of the following fonn:
- .v - [(I - !~)~!~](I t,)(s t ~)~ n~,, - n, ~
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where the equilibritnn conditions 11~~, -11~~ and J,, - 0 are imposed. As is immediately
obvious, any policy that reduces the value of employment relative to the value of the fall-
back position will increase the negotiated wage.
From these three Nash bargains, we obtain an average wage equation which is as follows:
t1~~. - y-[(I - f3)~~J(1 f t~~s t Qr~~A~~ -"~]
errn,, f crA,, t,~rirrA~, enA~,,, f crA, f gi7rA;,,where A~, - ' ` and Ar,, -
crr t cr~ t~~irr err f cr f~,~irr
We can re-write the average diftèrence in value between employment and the fall-back
situation as
A,, - A rh - f(.~IV ( see Section 3.6)
Substitutin~ this into the wage equation above and using [11] to eliminatey gives us the
following equilibrium average wage equation:
i~
[ 19] N ~ - ~1- ~14~B~.f ~'~
This equation determines average wage cost, given tightness. By expressing A~, - A~ as
the average wage multiplied by the expression .f ~.~, we are able to gain an explicit
expression for t1~~. in terms of f~, k, q~-~, Pr, P,~~,, P;~,. and the flow parameters of the
model. B enters f'~.~ throu~h a~fl~ only. As can be seen, taxes do not affect wage cost.
Thus taxes are borne by workers. Our model is almost complete~'. The zero-profit
condition [l l], and the wage equation [19], determine 9 and t1~ . By substituting 9 into
the steady-state equations [ I] -[4], we can determine ~, r., en, and irr (see appendix to this
chapter for expressions).
The model is illustrated in Fi~ure 3.2, below. In the top half of the Figure, the wage
equation [19] and the zero-protit condition [1I] are shown in ~t1~„9~-space. The wage
equation ( WS) is positively sloped since y'~B~ ~ 0 and ~~`'~c?B ~ 0. .f ~.~ is negatively
" Shortly. ~~e shall complete lhe model b~ endogenising the p,i~roll taz. T[tis allows us to check to see
~~hether thc siluation is work~iblc or no~, i.c. ~~hcthcr it provides an adequate ~~elfare safety uet for all
~~orkers, or no~.
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related to 9 due to the fact that as 9 increases this has the primary effect of raising the
chance of a searcher in the labour force entering a regular job. Whilst there is also a
secondary effect of raising the value of regular employment, it is the primary efiect which
dominates. The value of the fall-back position, as opposed to the value of regular
employment, increases. Therefore the difference in value between regular employment and
the average fall-back position falls. The zero-profit condition (zpc), on the other hand, is
negatively sloped due to q'~9~ ~ 0. In the bottom half of the Figure, the relationship
between total unemployment and labour-market tightness is illustrated. This relationship is
formulated from equations [ 1J-[4]. We refer to this relationship as the "Beveridge
curve".
Basically, any change which occurs in the bottom half of the diagram refers to the direct
effect of a policy change, whilst any change in the top half refers to the indirect effect
resulting from a policy change.
Ideally, we would like both the direct and the indirect effect on unemployment of a policy
change to be negative. In addition, we would like to see a policy which is free of
crowding-out problems. We see in Section 3.3, which of the policies available to us are
guaranteed to display all of these properties.
Figure 3.2
ws (zll
zpc I ~ ~ I
B
naveriJgt curvt ~ I ] - ~4J
7!
To complete the model, we endogenise the payroll tax. Whilst the endogenisation of the
payroll tax does not affect the comparative statics of the model, it does allow us to
examine whether the resulting situation is socially acceptable in that all members of the
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labour force are receiving a wage, or are entitled to benefits, at or above some minimum
level. Should this not be the case, then we consider the situation to be unworkable. For
example, if we simply cut unemployment benefits to below the minimum socially
acceptable level, without providing a guarantee of a place on a labour-market programme
with pay at or above the minimum level, then the situation would be considered socially
unacceptable and therefore unworkable. The worker in unemployment would not have the
protection of a welfare safety net, which is considered to be an element of any socially
acceptable system. This would be in spite of the fact that the comparative statics would
show an all-round improvement, in terms ofregular employment and unemployment.
In the steady state, we assume that the government revenue from the payroll tax equals the
expenditure on both unemployment benefits and on pay for participants on labour-market
programmes. Thus we have twe - p,N~r f p,,ui~~eu t p;,,wir~ . Simplification of this leaves
us with the following expression for the payroll tax in the steady state:
[20] t- P.~" } P~-„er~ t P~,~iir
e
From [19], we see that ia~ -~3k,~~1 -~~q~B~.f ~.~~1 f t~~ . Thus any increase in t will reduce
the wage, possibly to below the minimum level. If the wage does fall below the minimum
level, this itself would ensure that the system is unworkable. As can be seen from [20], t is
likely to increase if either p, , r, p,,,, , c~i, p;,, , or iii increase or if c decreases. If any of
these changes either reduces the wage to below the minimum level, or the welfare safety
net when not working (i.e. p,iv when labour-market programmes are guaranteed to all
unemployed workers but unemployment benetits are below the minimum level, p,w and
p,,ui~~ if p,uti~ is below the minimum level and placements on labour-market programmes
are guaranteed to those in Ill only, and p,tii~ and p,N ia~ if p~u ia~ is below the minimum
level and placements on labour-market programmes are guaranteed to those in EU only)
to below the minimum level, then we consider the resultant situation to be unworkable.
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3.3 Comparative statics of the model
In this section, we show the comparative statics of the model. The direct effect - that is,
the eftèct on the stocks due solely to the change in a policy parameter rather than due to a
change in B resulting from a change in the policy parameter - of a change in either y,~,
or ~r, on total unemployment, is ur ~ 0, i~„ ~ 0, and nR ~ 0, respectively (see Section
3.6 for details). Thus all usage of labour-market programmes has a negative direct effect
on unemployment, as expected. In Fi~ure 3.2, this would be seen as an upward shift of the
Beveridge curve. However, the direct effect of a change in either y,,u , or ~r , on regular
employment, is ~Y~O, e„~0, and e,~ ~0, respectively (see Section 3.6 for details). In other
words, regular employment can eitlier increase, decrease, or remain unchanged when there
is a change in the usa~e of programmes. Thus in Figure 3.3 below, we would see the
e- B~~ curve (the curve which relates the rate of regular employment to labour-market
tightness) moving either upwards, downwards, or remaining unchanged in response to any
of the afore-mentioned changes. So, for a given value of B, regular employment can either
increase, decrease, or remain unchanged. Thus the direct effect on regular employment of






On top of the direct etlèct of a policy change, there is an indirect wage effect which must
also be taken into account. The indirect etlèct of a policy change, is the change which
occurs in B which then atïècts the stocks. Since ri„ ~ 0 and c„ ~ 0(see Section 3.6 for
" Obtaincd from equaiious I~ I- I;I.
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details), we would prefer to see the wage-setting curve in Figures 3.2 and 3.3 shift to the
right. This reduces the wage cost to firms, thereby increasing B. We see that a change in a
policy parameter influences the wage (and consequently 9) according to the following
relationship:
d~~. ~sign ~ - sign (-1)~- sign ~
where x is a policy parameter. An increase in ~ has two primary wage effects. First of all,
it increases the value of regular employment relative to the fall-back position due to
increasing the employed worker's probability of being placed on a labour-market
programme; and, secondly, it increases the proportion of searchers on labour-market
programmes, thereby increasing the value of the fall-back position relative to employment.
As a consequence of these two opposing effects, we find that ó)`'~ó,u ~0. Thus the indirect
wage effect of a change in N is ambiguous. Labour-market tightness can increase,
decrease, or remain unchanged when fi is changed.
As for changes in either y or ~r, the primary eftèct is to increase the proportion of
searchers on labour-market programmes, thereby making a higher proportion of searchers
better ot~; as well as increasing the value of being in unemployment. This primary effect
outweighs the secondary eftèct of increasing the value of regular employment. Thus we
have c~`~~r?y ~ 0 and c~`~~c~~c ~ 0. Thus if either y or n are increased, the value of being
outside regular employment increases to a larger extent than the value of being in regular
employment. As a result, labour-market tightness decreases.
So far in this section, we have analysed the effects of altering flows within our model.
However, there are other policy parameters available to us, namely the replacement ratios
with regard to unemployment. The direct effect of altering either of these replacement
ratios is zero. The Beveridge curve or the e- 6 curve remain unaffected by any changes in
either of these replacement ratios. The indirect wage effect of increasing either of these
replacement ratios is to increase the wage and reduce labour-market tightness since an
increase in unemployment benefits makes the average fall-back position more attractive
relative to regular employment, i.e. c~`~~p,,u ~ 0 and c~`'~~p;,, ~ 0. Altering either of these
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replacement ratios is the only policy change which has unambiguous effects. The following
table summarises the findings of this section:
Table 3. I












?`~ 9 9 ~ 9 9 9 9 9
TY T y J~ T ~ 9 ~ 9
T 7I T ~Y J~ ~ ~ 9 ~ 9
~P,.,, ~ T a J. ~- o T T
~P;,, J~ T o .~ .t- o T T
As can be seen, no usage of labour-market programmes can be guaranteed to have
desirable effects on both unemployment and regular employment. As a result, we cannot
make any cr priuri predictions about what will happen to unemployment or regular
employment when we undertake a policy change. In all three cases, both unemployment
and regular employment can either increase, decrease, or remain unchanged. To see clearly
what happens when we alter any of the policy parameters in the model, we resort to some
numerical simulations in the next section to gain some idea as to the likely effect of the
usage of labour-market programmes on unemployment and regular employment.
One possibility which we analyse in the next section is the possibility of combining a policy
of targeted labour-market programmes together with a policy of reducing unemployment
benefits. By this, we can partially offset the indirect wage effect on unemployment (which
can be positive) by reducing unemployment benefits (which shifts the wage-setting curve
to the right).
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3.4 Simulation analyses of the us~ge of labour-market progr:~mmes
In all of the simulations which we undertake, we begin from a base run where labour-
market programmes are absent and unemployment benefits are above the minimum level.
We then introduce labour-market programmes to see what the outcome is on the various
policy objectives. We also show what the situation would be like if we reduce
unemployment benefits to their minimum level.
Since the model in this chapter is an extension of the model in the previous chapter, we
use the same parameter values for those parameters which are relevant in both chapters.
For those new parameters which are part of the model in this chapter but not the previous
chapter, we attempt to use values which hopefully could have some meaning in actual
labour markets. We have looked at labour markets in Great Britain, Denmark, and
Sweden, and have sought to gain a range of values which may be relevant to actual
situations. With regard to the parameters c and g(the chance that a worker on a
programme and a worker in ineffective unemployment will be matched to a regular job, in
comparison to a worker in effective unemployment, respectively) we have sought to gain a
set of values which show what the outcome may be with a variety of situations within the
labour market. We show situations where a worker who enters a programme from
ineffective unemployment may actually liave a lower chance of being matched to a regular
job when on a progranune in comparison to when they were in ineffective unemployment.
We also simulate situations where a worker on a programme has a higher chance of
gaining a regular job than if that worker were in ineffective unemployment.
The objectives which we aim for are the following: a reduction in total unemployment; a
reduction in ineffective unemployment; an increase in the present values of all workers in
the labour force; and a crowding in of regular employment. Thus we would like to see a
reduction in unemployment accompanied by an increase in regular employment. If all of
these objectives are achieved then we consider the policy under consideration to be an
unequivocal success.
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3.4.1 An ex~mple where c-0.5 ~nd g-0.2
In our first example, shown in Table 3.2, we see a situation where the total unemployment
rate initially stands at 150~0. In this initial situation, there are no labour-market
programmes, and the unemployment benefit system is passive in that it is set above its
minimum level (which in this simulation we will consider to be fifty percent of the average
wage in simulation 8, i.e. the level of unemployment benefits in that simulation). From this
base run, we move on to show various types of usage of labour-market programmes, as
well as a simple cut in unemployment benefits to the minimum level (for comparative
purposes).
In our second simulation, we target labour-market programmes at those in E(I. The result
is a fall in regular employment, a huge increase in the number of workers on labour-market
programmes, and a cut in total unemployment to less than one percent. Whilst it is true
that unemployment is sharply reduced, it is also the case that regular employment is
crowded out. Furthermore, the present value to the worker of being in any of the possible
labour-market states has declined. Thus this policy can hardly be viewed as a success here,
despite the strong decline in unemployment.
In our third simulation, we guarantee all those in regular employment a place on a labour-
market programme, should they exit from their job. As a result of this policy, total
unemployment declines, though not by as much as in the second simulation. Also, regular
employment is again crowded out. Finally, the present value to workers in all of the
labour-market states declines. Again, we can hardly view this policy as a success, since all
of the workers in the labour market are actually made worse off.
For our fourth simulation, we target labour-market programmes at those in IU. This time
there is only a slight fall in total unemployment, in relation to the base run, but ineffective
unemployment is almost totally eliminated. Furthermore, there is a slight crowding i~r of
regular employment. The present value to the worker of being in either regular
employment or ineffective unemployment increases, whilst the present value of being in
effective unemployment declines slightly, due to the reduced flow from effective
unemployment into regular employment. Overall, however, the average present value
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increases. Despite the fact that the fall in unemployment is not as substantial as with the
first two policies, there is absolutely no problem with crowding out. Thus we view this
policy as a success.
So far, we have not analysed the possibility of using labour-market programmes in
conjunction with altering the level of unemployment benefits. Since we have an initial
situation where unemployment benefits are above their minimum level, we can have a
policy package where labour-market programmes are used along with reducing
unemployment benefits. In our fifth simulation, we target labour-market programmes at
those in EU whilst reducing unemployment benefits to their minimum level. As a result of
reducing unemployment benefits, we can reduce the replacement ratio of pay on labour-
market programmes and still maintain incentive compatibility. The result of this policy is
slightly better than when we targeted labour-market programmes at those in ECI whilst
leaving unemployment benefits unaltered. Unemployment is reduced still further.
However, whilst the crowding out here is not as bad as when unemployment benefits
remained unaltered, it is still present. Furthermore, all workers in the labour force are
worse off in comparison to the base run situation. Therefore we cannot regard this policy
as successful.
In simulation number 6, we guarantee those in regular employment a place on a labour-
market programme should they exit from their job, and we also reduce unemployment
benefits to their minimum level. This time, the guarantee of a place on a labour-market
programme still crowds out regular employment, but less so than when we used labour-
market programmes on their own. In addition, unemployment is reduced further than
when unemployment benefits remained unchanged. However, when we look at the present
values of workers, we see that all workers are worse off as compared to the base run.
Thus this policy must be deemed to be unsuccessful.
In our seventh simulation, we target labour-market programmes at those in ICI whilst
reducing unemployment benefits to their minimum level. The result is a larger reduction in
unemployment plus an even stronger crowding in effect than previously, when ~r was
increased whilst unemployment benefits were unchanged. Again the rate of ineffective
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unemployment declines heavily. All workers are better off in with this policy. Thus this
policy must surely be viewed as a success.
In simulation number 8, we refrain from using labour-market programmes but reduce
unemployment benefits to their minimum level. The result, as can be seen, is a reduction in
unemployment plus a crowding in of regular employment. However, in comparison to
simulation number 7, the rate of ineffective unemployment is still high. All workers are
better off than in the base run. Thus we view this policy as a success.
Of all the simulations undertaken in this example, the ones which showed the best results
were simulations 7 and 8. In simulation 7, the policy of directing labour-market
programmes at those in ineffective unemployment crowded in regular employment, made
all workers better off, and reduced ineffective unemployment substantially. In simulation
8, the policy of reducing unemployment benefits to their minimum possible level and not
using labour-market programmes crowded in regular employment, made all workers better
off but left ineffective unemployment quite high. Furthermore, the policy of directing
labour-market programmes at those in ineffective unemployment made the average worker
better off than the policy of inerely reducing unemployment benefits.
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3.4.2 An example where c-0.0 ,md g-0.1
In our second example, shown in Table 3.3 below, we see another situation where the
total unemployment rate stands initially at 150~0. As with the previous example, and all the
subsequent examples in this chapter, the minimum level of unemployment benefits is
assumed to be SOo~o ofthe average wage in simulation S, i.e. where unemployment benefits
are set at their lowest absolute value (this will be the case for all subsequent examples in
this chapter). As in the previous example, here we have a situation where the
unemployment benefit system is initially passive in that the level of unemployment benefit
exceeds the minimum level. As with the previous example, we can alter the level of
unemployment benefit along with using labour-market programmes. An important aspect
of this example, is that the worker in ineffective unemployment has more of a chance of
directly gaining a regular job than a worker on a labour-market programme.
In our second simulation, we target labour-market programmes at those in El! whilst
leaving unemployment benetits unchanged. The result is disastrous. Whilst it is true that
total unemployment is reduced to a rate of less than 20~0, the rate of regular employment
has fallen to under l00~0. Most of the labour force has ended up on a labour-market
programme. Since we require labour-market programmes to be incentive compatible in
order that workers accept the otièr of a placement on a labour-market programme, the
replacement ratio for a worker on a labour-market programme is very high. In addition,
because the fraction of the labour force on labour-market programmes is so high, this
situation is imworkable. Even those in regular employment would have a wage below the
social minimum!
In our third situation, we guarantee all of tliose in regular employment a place on a labour-
market programme, should they be separated trom their job. This time, unemployment
falls slightly but there is a signiticant level of crowding out. Ineflèctive unemployment
remains quite high, and in acldition all workers are worse ofi than in the base run. Thus
this policy must be seen as a failure.
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Our fourth simulation sees labour-market programmes being targeted at those in I(I.
Unemployment declines slightly, but instead of crowding out we have a situation of
crowding in. When we consider tliat the worker who moves from I(I to R is, for a short
while, giving up any chance ofgaining a regular job, this may appear somewhat surprising.
What actually happens is that the worker temporarily loses a weak chance of gaining a
regular job in return for gaining a maximum chance on leaving R. Unemployment is
reduced and ineffective unemployment is eliminated. On top of this, all workers in the
labour force are made better off. Thus this policy is an unequivocal success.
In the next three simulations, we use labour-market programmes in conjunction with
unemployment benetit policy. Labour-market programmes are targeted at a particular
group of workers whilst unemployment benefits are reduced to their minimum level. The
policy of targeting labour-market programmes at those in GU ( No. 5) is shown to be
unworkable. Targeting labour-market programmes at those leaving regular employment
(No. 6) does reduce unemployment but leads to crowding out of regular employment.
Also, ineffective unemployment is still quite high and all the workers in the labour force
are worse ofï than they were in the base run. Only the policy of targeting labour-market
programmes at those in IU (No. 7) leads to a crowding in of regular employment and thus
a reduction in total unemployment. The policy of directing labour-market programmes at
those in ineffective unemployment in conjunction with tightening the unemployment
benefit system makes all workers even better ot~' than merely using labour-market
programmes on their own.
In simulation 8, we reduce unemployment benefits to their minimum level. This crowds in
regular employment, thereby reducing total unemployment. Despite the fact that
unemployment is reduced, inet~èctive unemployment is still high. All workers are made
better off with this policy. Thus we regard this policy as an unequivocal success.
Of all the policies undertaken in this example, three were able to crowd in regular
employment: the policy of directing labour-market programmes at those in ineffective
unemployment without tightening the unemployment benefit system; the policy of
directing unemployment benefits at those in ineffective unemployment in conjunction with
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tightening the unemployment benefit system; and the policy of tightening the
unemployment benefit system without using labour-market programmes. All of these
policies made all workers in the labour force better off However, only the policies which
involved directing labour market programmes at those in ineffective unemployment were
able to reduce ineffective unemployment significantly. And since directing labour-market
programmes at those in ineffective unemployment in corji~nctinr~ with tightening the
unemployment benefit system was better on all counts than the policy of using labour-
market programmes on their own, it is this policy which we regard as the most successful
in this example.
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3.4.3 A situation where c-1.0 and g-0.3
In our third example, shown in Table 3.4 below, we see a situation where again the total
unemployment rate stands initially at I 50~0. Here we see that c- 1.0, i.e. those on labour-
market programmes search as intensively as those in effective unemployment (note that
those on labour-market programmes search more intensively than those in ineffective
unemployment, i.e. c ~ ~,~ ).
As can be seen, regular employment is crowded in in simulations 3,5,6,7, and 8.
Simulation number 6, where labour-market programmes are directed at those leaving
regular employment, in conjunction with a tight unemployment benefit policy, gives the
greatest degree of crowding in. Moreover, it raises the present values of workers the
most. Despite this, ineftèctive unemployment is not reduced by as much as when labour-
market progrannnes are directed at those in ineffective unemployment (not surprisingly).
Since c is so high here, we gain very good results all round. All of the policy changes give
a higher avera~e present value to workers in comparison to the base run. And none of
these policies lead to crowding out of regular employment at all. As to which policy is the
best here, it is not immecliately clear. Wliilst it is true that the policy of guaranteeing places
on labour-market programmes to those exiting from regular employment in conjunction
with a tight benefit system leads to the greatest degree of crowding in of regular
employment and the lar~est increase in present values, it still leaves ineffective
unemployment higher than if labour-market programmes were directed at the unemployed.
Thus to really judge which policy is the most successful, we require an explicit regime of
how we evaluate each policy goal. We consider such a procedure to be outside the scope
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3.4.4 An example where c-0.0 ;tnd g-0.5
In this, our tinal example, we see a situation where those on labour-market programmes
have no chance of gaining a regular job directly, whilst those in III have quite a large
chance of gaining a regular job in comparison to the three previous examples. The base
run in this example shows an initial situation where the rate of unemployment stands at
l00~0. From there, we carry out various policies. Table 3.5 below shows us what happens.
As can be seen, all the policies which involve using labour-market programmes crowd out
regular employment. Indeed, tlie crowding out caused by directing labour-market
programmes at those in EII would lead to such a huge decline in the average wage that the
situation would be unworkable. All of the policies involving labour-market programmes
reduce the present values of workers. Tlie only policy which crowds in regular
employment thus reducing unemployment, is the policy of reducing unemployment
benefits. In simulation 8, we see how regular employment is crowded in, thereby reducing
unemployment, by reducing unemployment benetits to their minimum level. This is the
only policy which increases the present values of all workers in the labour force.
So why are labour-market programmes such a failure in this example? The reason is that
all workers when entering a labour-market programme are gaining a worse chance of
entering a regular job in tlie short run than by being unemployed. As a result, there is some
crowding out. To induce workers to accept places on labour-market programmes requires
a higher-than-previous replacement ratio. This reduces the difference in the value of
regular employment and non-employment. Add to this the impossibility of those currently
on labour-market programmes from entering regular employment, and we see why
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3.5 Conclusion
In conclusion, we see that we can use labour-market programmes as a means of crowding
in rather than crowding out regular employment. However, whether labour-market
programmes should be targeted at those flowing out of regular employment, those in EU,
or those in IZI, depends crucially on the parameter values of the model. Indeed, as we saw
in Section 3.4.4, it may well be the case that all policies involving the use of labour-market
programmes crowd out regular employment.
As is very clear from the preceding analysis, the only policy guaranteed to crowd in
regular employment is the policy of reducing the level of unemployment benefits. Whilst
this policy does not have a direct etFect on unemployment, it does have an indirect effect
on unemployment, as seen in Figure 3.4 below:
Figure 3.4
Reducing the level of unemployment benefits leads to an increase in the difference
between the value from being in regular employment and the value from being
unemployed. As a result, the wa~e-setting curve shifts to the right. The zero-profit curve
is unaffected by any changes in the policy parameters. It is the wage-setting curve which
shifts downwards. This in turn leads to a fall in the wage cost for firms, which has the
effect of increasing B. Since the flow into regular employment a is positively related to
B, regular employment is thus crowded in. Notice that the c- B curve is unaffected by a
change in the level of unemployment benetits. This curve remains static, though we see a
movement along it due to the shift in the wage-setting curve increasing the value of 6.
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Since this policy reduces unemployment without doing so by increasing the number of
states which a worker can find themself in, the trade-off is only between unemployment
and regular employment. Hence by reducing unemployment, this necessarily increases
regular employment.
So if this modiis opera~idi is the only policy available to us which guarantees a crowding in
of regular employment, why bother using labour-market programmes? Quite simply, it
may well be the case that using labour-market programmes in conjunction with a tight
unemployment benetit system can give us a better result than can the sole use of a tight
unemployment benetit. This is blatantly clear in Section 3.4.2 where the reduced
unemployment benefits solution gives us a rate of re~ular employment of 90.32a~o, whilst
additionally directing labour-market programmes at those in ineffective unemployment
gives us a rate of regular employment of 91.260~0. Furthermore, the policy of inerely
reducing unemployment benefits fails to reduce ineffective unemployment to the extent
which targeting labour-market programmes at those in IU does.
An important thin; to note in the preceding analysis is that very often when labour-market
programmes lead to a crowding in of regular employment, this increases the expected
present value of the lifetime income of all workers. By crowding in regular employment,
we are able to reduce the payroll tax which falls entirely on the wage. Thus the worker in
regular employment benetits directly trom this.
However, even those in unemployment may benetit from, for example, guaranteeing those
in regular employment a placement on a labour-market programme should they exit from
their job, along with reducin~ unemployment benefits. In Section 3.4.3 such a policy leads
not only to a fall in the payroll tax, thereby increasing the take-home wage of the worker
in regular employment; but it also reduces the wage cost to the firm and thus increases the
flow into regular employment. Thus the unemployed worker now has a higher chance of
gaining a regular job, along with the prospect of higher wages once in regular
employment.
Do Programmes Necessarily Crowd Out? 85
The moral of the story told in this chapter, is that labour-market programmes can be
actively used to crowd in re~ular employment, thereby reducin; unemployment. However,
this result is not guaranteed. We must first find out the parameter values of the model to
see if the crowdin~ in result will hold or not. Furthermore, whilst it is true that merely
reducing the level of unemployment benefits is guaranteed to crowd in regular
employment, to restrict ourselves to this policy would starve ourselves of the possibility of
using a more effective policy package which involves actively using labour-market
programmes together with a strict unemployment benefit system.
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3.G Appendix
Using equations [ 1], [3], and [4] and the identities l- e f r f err f irr and
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Since a is a one-to-one function of 8, we can plot the Beveridge curve in the bottom half
of Figure 3.2 using the expression for rr, [AS]. Similarly we are able to draw the e-B
curve in Figure 3.3, using the expression for e, [AI]. Any movement of these curves, due
to a change in a policy parameter, indicates the direct efiect of a change in the policy
parameter concerned. Movement along these curves occurs due to an indirect effect of a
policy change.
The direction of the indirect eftèct of a policy change depends on which way the wage-
setting curve in Figures 3.2 and 3.3 shifts. This in turn depends positively on how the
expression f~.~ changes with respect to a change in a policy parameter. The expression
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f~.~ is related to the difierence between the average value of employment and the average
fall-back position. It is gained using [A2], [A3], [A4], and the following equations and
identities:
[A6] ~bt~~n~-, - ~~'r }fr~n. }~I-N~~n~„
[A~] ~h } ~~n~-.,, - iv~~„ t fr~n. } ~1- fr~~n~„
[A8] ~b }~~n~~,~ - w;N f fr~n,. t~1- fr~~n~-„
[A9] ~8 t ca f~~n, - p,ia~ f can~., f~n~,~,
[A 10] ~b t a t Y } 4~~n~-„ - P~.,,"' -~ an,.,,, } Yn, f yin~„
[A I 1] ~d f,~a f ~r~n;~, - P,,,~~' }~t'an~.,,, }~rn,
[AIZ]
[A13] n,h -
[A 14] ia~ -
~„n -~„ f ~,-n,,, t~,~;r,n ~,,,
extcr'fgin
~,rn,,,, f~.r.n, t~;rrn;,,
c,r f c~l~ f ~;i„
etni~~„ f ci~i.i~, t grma;N
crr t cr~ t~;irr
(Further details available on request)
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3.7 Addendum to Ch;ipter 3: rejectable labour-market progr~mmes in this extended
model15
Whilst in Chapter 3 we have concerned ourselves with using labour-market programmes in
an "acceptable" context, it is also worth looking at whether and how they can be used in a
rejectable context, as indicated in Chapter 2. Is there any scope for using rejectable
programmes within the context of this extended model? The answer is yes, though not
always. However, when there is scope for usin~ rejectable labour-market pro~rammes, the
results of this usage are unequivocal.
An ex~mple where c-0.5 and g-0.2
In example ~.4. l, we can gain superior results to merely usin~ acceptable programmes by
either using rejectable proDrammes on their own or in conjunction with acceptable
programmes. If we look at Table 3.2a below, which corresponds with Table 3.2 in the
main text, we see that when using acceptable labour-market pro~rammes, the largest
increase in regular employment was trom 850~o to 86.820~0 of the labour force. However,
we could achieve even more crowding in if we merely cut unemployment benefits to their
minimum level (regular employment increased to 86.880~0). However, if we now offer
those in effective unemployment rejectable labour-market programmes whilst paying those
in ineffective unemployment the minimum level of unemployment benefits, then we can
increase regular employment to 89.32 (Run 9, Table 3.2a). But we can do even better than
this. If we oftèr those in etièctive unemployment places on rejectable programmes whilst
at the same time ot~èr those in inet}èctive unemployment places on acceptable
pro~rammes, then we can increase regular employment to 90.770~0 (Run 10, Table 3.2a).
Thus the best policy in this situation is a mix of acceptable and rejectable labour-market
programmes. We should offer rejectable programmes to those with a maximum chance of
entering a regular job and offer acceptable programmes to those who have less chance of
entering regular employment.
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An example where c-0 ~nd g-0.1
In this example, similar to the immediately preceding example, we can gain superior
results with respect to the increase in regular employment by either oftèring places on
rejectable programmes to those in effective unemployment and offering minimum
unemployment benefits to those in inet~ective unemployment (Run 9, Table 3.3a), or by
ofiering those in effective unemployment places on rejectable programmes whilst offering
those in ineffective unemployment places on acceptable programmes (Run 10, Table 3.3a).
The fonner policy gives a regular employment rate of 90.320~o whilst the latter policy gives
an employment rate of 91.260~0. Thus we see that once more a policy which involves
rejectable labour-market programmes can further crowd in regular employment.
An ex~mple where c-1.0 ~nd g-0.3
In this example, there is no scope for using rejectable labour-market programmes. This is
due to the fact that when on a programme, a worker has the maximum chance of entering
a regular job. Thus there is no scope for rejectable labo~n--market programmes here. If a
worker enters a programme from ineffective unemployment, and the programme by
assumption must pay at least the minimum income, then the expected value of lifetime
income increases for the worker since they now have a higher chance of gaining a regular
job. For a worker in et~èctive unemployment, entering a programme is also beneficial
because it prevents the said worker from entering ineffective unemployment since there is
no way of directly entering inet~èctive unemployment from a programme. Thus the
problem with attempting to offer rejectable programmes is that programmes are just too
attractive here.
An example where c-0 and g-0.5
In our final example, we see that rejectable programmes again have a role to play. By
offering those in effective unemployment places on rejectable programmes in conjunction
with giving those in ineffective unemployment the minimum level of unemployment
benefits, we can improve on any of the policies given in the main text. Regular
employment is increased from 900~o to 92.950~0. However, we can improve on this policy
by offering all unemployed workers places on rejectable programmes. With the latter
policy, regular employment increases to 94.210~0 - quite significant crowding in.
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Conclusion to this ~ddendum
The conclusion here is tliat the use of rejectable programmes, if possible, may be able to
offer better results than the use of only acceptable programmes and~or reducing
unemployment benetits to their minimum level. However, as was clearly seen, there may
be scope for using both rejectable and acceptable programmes.
Chapter 4
The Effects of Labour-Market Policies When There is a Loss of
Skill During Llnemployment.
Abstract
In this chapter, there are two types of workers: primary workers; and secondary workers.
Primary workers are those workers who, when in employment, are fully productive and,
when in unemployment, have a maximum search intensity. Secondary workers, on the
other hand, may be less than fully productive when employed. In addition, they may have a
lower search intensity than primary workers when unemployed. A primary worker
becomes a secondary worker by tirst spending a length of time in unemployment. Thus the
event of an unemployed primary worker becoming a secondary worker is duration-
dependent. An unemployed secondary worker can become a primary worker by either first
being employed as a secondary worker or by taking a place on a labour-market
programme. However, in this model we allow for the possibility that taking a job or a
place on a labour-market programme may not guarantee that the worker will become a
primary worker. In this chapter, labour-market programmes are directed at secondary
workers in unemployment. The general result of this moc~ris operuitdi is ambiguous. The
proportion of primary workers, the proportion of secondary workers, and the rate of total
unemployment can all either íncrease, decrease, or remain unchanged, when labour-market




Until recently, many observers hailed Sweden's ability to maintain low levels of
unemployment as an outstanding success. This was especially pertinent in light of the
ravaging unemployment which Great Britain and much of Europe was experiencing.
Often, this success was attributed to Sweden's extensive use of active labour-market
policies. Miller (1991) states that "whilst most OECD countries spend only a fraction of
lo~o of GNP on active labour-market policies, Sweden spends between two and three
percent". Many observers, seeing Sweden's prevalent use of active labour-market policies
together with its low rate of unemployment, viewed the former as a cause of the latter.
There appears, however, to be rather little empirical evidence to support such an opinion.
Indeed, in the last few years, Sweden has itself experienced unemployment rates of
mainstream European magnitude, despite the continued usage of active labour-market
policies. For example, in 1988 the unemployment rate was 1.60~o whilst the percentage of
the labour force in labour-market programmes was I.30~0. Yet in 1993, unemployment had
reached a post-war high of 8.20~o whilst the percentage of the labour force on labour-
market programmes had reached around 40~0. Thus it is clear to see that there has been no
let up in Sweden's usage of labour-market programmes.
A notable feature of unemployment is the dispersion of its durations. As Layard, Nickell 8c
Jackman (1991) point out, "between 1979 and 1986, the proportion of unemployed who
had been out of work for over a year rose from around twenty to around forty percent in
Britain". Thus we can see quite clearly that one problem associated with unemployment is
not merely its level but also its duration. Furthennore, the widely varying duration of
unemployment spells often has little to do with the initial characteristics of the unemployed
individual. Jackman 8z Layard (1991), for example, find little evidence of the existence of
heterogeneity as a causal factor of unemployment duration. They further find strong
evidence for the dependency of the rate of exit from unemployment on the length of
duration of unemployment: "The proportion of unemployed people who leave
unemployment within a given time period is much lower for those who have been
unemployed for longer durations. For example, in Britain in early 1984 the proportion was
four percent per quarter for men who had been unemployed for over four years, compared
with f'orty percent for men unemployed under three months". Thus any matching model of
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the labour market will be more realistic if it encompasses some form of distinction
between the rates of exit into employment from long- and short-term unemployment.
Whilst there is evidence of differing exit rates from unemployment depending on duration,
there is also a possibility that longer unemployment durations result in a loss of human
capital for the worker. Just as the acquisition of skills, i.e. the formation of human capital,
is a positive process, so is the depletion of skills a negative process. When a worker is
unemployed, especially for long durations, skills become rusty and the worker's
productive potential declines. Layard, Nickell, 8c Jackman, Jackman 8z Layard, and
Pissarides (1992) all point to this possibility. If this is the case then it will certainly be
worthwhile to incorporate the possibility of skill loss resulting from unemployment
duration in our model.
With regard to reduced search intensity as a result of unemployment duration, there are
two strong reasons as to why this may occur. Firstly, a worker may become discouraged
from searching for work due to the lack of success to date. Having searched for work but
had no success in obtaining any, the worker may begin to feel that search is simply not
worth the eftórt. They therefore curtail the amount of effort they expend on search.
Secondly, search intensity may be reduced due to the fact that search costs money and
those who have been out of employment for a given length of time may be unable to
afford the level of search which tliey would wish to choose if unconstrained by their
budget.
The OECD Employment Outlook ( I995) points to much evidence on workers reducing
their search intensity significantly with unemployment duration, though still remaining
within the labour force with a limited search intensity. This is evidenced in a multitude of
countries. Layard, Nickell, 8c Jackman, looking at evidence for Great Britain, find that
there is some evidence of a decline in tlie amount of time spent in search as a result of
duration of unemployment. They find further that the amount of money an unemployed
worker spends on search activity declines lieavily with duration of unemployment. This




British Male Lon,-Spell Unemployed Workers, 1978~79.
Hours of search er week 6 weeks duration 12 months duration
U to 5 hours er week 54 64
6-9 hours er week 16 l7






6 weeks duration 12 months duration
Nothin 26 42
Under f 1 35 34
~1 - f3 26 18
~3 or more 13 6
100 100
Source: Layard. NickclL and Jackman (1991), Page 23(i. These figures, which are percentages, refer to
long-spell unemplo~ed workers. B~ this. the~~ mean Ihose workers who remained out of work after one
year's uncmployment. These ~~~orkers ~~ere suncied aC1er G ~~eeks of unemploymenL and later after
one year of uneiuplo~ ment.
Thus we see that there are strong reasons as to why workers may wish to reduce their
level of search intensity as the period of time they spend as unemployed increases.
Furthertnore, we see that there does exist empirical evidence of reduced search intensity as
a result of duration of unemploytnent. We feel, therefore, that to incorporate this
possibility into our model adds significantly to our analysis.
Pissarides (1992) looks at skill loss within an overlapping l;enerations framework. In an
environment where firms are unable to discriminate cx crnte between workers of different
skill levels, he finds that a one-period negative shock to employment can persist for a long
time after the duration of the shock and the maxiirtum duration of unemployment. The
negative shock leads to a fall in hirin~ which in turn leads to an increase in the duration of
unemployment. This increased duration leads to a loss of skill meaning that workers
becotne less attractive to firms. As a result, fewer jobs cotne onto the market in the next
period. Thus the unemployment duration of the new cohort of unemployed will also be
above the trend value, even if all of the unemployed from the preceding period have exited
from unemployment.
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Another attempt at explaining the persistence result of a negative shock to employment is
that of Diego (1994). Diego again uses an overlapping generations framework with a
matching structure to analyse the persistence of a shock. He finds that a fall in skill
resulting from unemployment leads to the persistence of transitory shocks. This is despite
the fact that firms are able ex a~~t~ to discriminate between different types of workers,
unlike in the Pissarides paper. What drives the persistence result here, is a certain degree
ofcomplementarity in production between workers with difierent skill levels.
Whilst there is an abundance of literature on the usage of labour-market policies, little is
really mentioned as to hcn~~ these labour-market policies are actually carried out, in terms
of design and targeting, etc. In this cliapter, we look at a matching model where there is a
single labour market Uut two types of workers: primary workers; and secondary workers.
Primary workers exhibit maximum productivity and maximum search intensity. Secondary
workers, on the other hand, exhibit either lower productivity, in relation to primary
workers, and~or low search iiitensity. Primary workers move from the primary labour
force to the secondary labour force by tlowin~ f~om primary unemployment to secondary
unemployment. Exit from the secondary sector to the primary sector, however, can occur
through one of two ways: Firstly, a worker can exit from a secondary job into primary
unemployment; and, secondly, a worker can leave secondary unemployment to gain a
place on a labour-market programme and from there exit into primary unemployment. The
very fact that a worker has recently held a job or been on a labour-market programme can
rehabilitate them into the primary labour force. Indeed, the usage of labour-market
programmes in this model is limited to attempting to rehabilitate unemployed workers
back into the primary labour force. This mndii.c upei~cu~di is strongly motivated by such
comments as that made by Jackman 8c Layard that "... if lon~term unemployment can
destroy human capital, it is more likely that work experience can rebuild it".
It is important to note, however, that just because a secondary worker has taken a job or
been on a labour-market programme, thís does not necessarily transform them into a
primary worker. Thus in this chapter, we allow for the possibility that a worker who has
taken a secondary job or a place on a labour-market programme may exit back into
secondary unemployment rather than primary unemployment. How we model this will be
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seen later in this chapter, but essentially the worker taking a secondary job or a place on a
labour-market programme can see it as a lottery. Whether the worker exits into the
primary labour force or the secondary labour force is a matter of chance.
Three characteristics of this study distinguish it from other matching-model analyses.
Firstly, it allows for the possibility ofskill loss, as a result ofunemployment duration. Thus
the longer a worker stays in unemployment, the more likely is that worker to become less-
than-fully productive. Secondly, it provides for the possibility that workers may become
less likely to obtain a job, as a result of length of time in unemployment. This may be the
result of the following (a) Firms may prefer to search for primary workers in the labour
market; and (b) secondary workers may search less intensively for a job than primary
workers, due to being discouraged from their lack of success to date. Allowing for a lower
possibility of a match occurring between a firm and an unemployed worker due to
duration of unemployment has, however, also been analysed in a matching framework in
the previous chapter.
The third and tinal ditierence, that the participation on a labour-market programme or the
acceptance of a regular job may not transform a secondary worker into a primary worker,
is a unique idea within the matchina model framework. It allows for the possibility that
labour-market programmes may not be designed correctly and that they may merely be a
stop-gap between spells of secondary unemployment. Thus the idea that participation on a
labour-market programme will necessarily transform a worker from a secondary worker to
a primary worker is relaxed in this chapter. Similarly, the idea that the acceptance of a
regular job by a secondary worker will transform that worker into a primary worker is also
relaxed. The addition of these possibilities to the model make it a far more general model
with which to analyse the labour market than otherwise.
In this chapter, we undertake some simulations to see how the targeting of labour-market
programmes at those in secondary unemployment affects the labour market. From our
simulations, we find that anything can happen. The proportion of the labour force who are
primary workers and the proportion of the labour force who are secondary workers, can
either increase, decrease, or remain unchanged This result, however, depends on how well
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labour-market programmes transform secondary into primary workers in comparison with
secondaiy employment. The effect on the total unemployment rate is ambiguous.
This chapter takes the followin~ format: In the next section, we make our model explicit,
settin~ out the framework and assumptions from which our results are derived. In Section
4.3, we briefly review the comparative statics of the model. In Section 4.4, we undertake
some simulations to gain an idea of the likely outcomes of using labour-market
programmes. In Section 4.4. I, we look at an example of a labour market where there is no
skill loss, but search intensity is lower amongst secondary workers. In this example,
secondary workers have a fifty percent chance of exiting into the primary labour force
from either a regular job or a labour-market programme. [n Section 4.4.2, we analyse a
labour market where both skill loss and lower search intensity are exhibited by secondary
workers. If a secondary worker takes a regular job, they are ~uaranteed to exit from that
job into the primary labour force. However, if they take a place on a labour-market
programme, then they only have a titty percent chance of exiting into the primary labour
force.
In Section 4.4.3, workers in the secondary labour force again exhibit lower productivity
and lower search intensity; though this time, if they take a place on a labour-market
programme they are guaranteed to exit into the primary labour force, whilst if they take a
regular job, they only have a fifty percent chance of exiting into the primary labour force.
Section 4.4.4 shows a labour market similar to that analysed in Section 4.4.3 except that
skill loss is even more pronounced. In our tinal simulation, in Section 4.4.5, we see an
example of a labour market where skill loss is present though not any reduction in search
intensity. In this example, a secondary worker who takes a regular job is guaranteed to
exit into the primary labour force. A secondary worker who takes a place on a labour-
market programme, however, has only a ten percent chance of exitin~ into the primary
labour force.
For all the simulations which we undertake, we start each analysis from a situation where
there are no labour-market programmes and proceed by increasing the flow out of
secondary unemployment into pro~rammes. By starting with a base run where labour-
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market programmes are absent we are able to compare different intensities of the usage of
such programmes with a situation where they are absent. Section 4.5 summarises the
results from the preceding analysis and attempts to draw a conclusion.
4.2 The model
The model which we consider in this chapter is a matching model of the labour market
where the matching of workers to jobs is both costly and time-consuming. Thus, in
equilibrium, there is unemployment because a well-defined labour market does not exist.
Firms do not immediately meet workers. Workers are matched to jobs by an aggregate
matching function H- h~.í',V~, where .S is the number of searchers and V is the number
of vacancies. H is characterised by constant returns to scale technology and is increasing in
both its arguments. Thus, should there be more searchers in the labour market, then there
will be more matches taking place, firms tinding it easier to find workers. Similarly, more
vacancies will make it easier for a worker to find a vacancy and fill it. The number of
searchers is equal to the number of primaiy workers in unemployment plus some
proportion of the number of secondaiy workers in unemployment. Thus we have the
identity .í' - U~ f cll2, where ll ~ and l12 denote the number of primary and secondary
workers in unemployment respectively and 0 ~ c 5 1 The motivation for allowing
secondary unemployment to be weighted by c- which is able to take a value below unity,
lies in the possibility that those in secondary unemployment do not search as intensively as
those in primary unemployment.
In the economy which we analyse, the total labour force (L) is fixed. Thus we do not allow
for flows into or out of the labour force. In this chapter, we denote the rates of primary
and secondary unemployment as n~ - U~ ~L and ~~2 - Uz ~L respectively. (The convention
hereafter will be that all lower-case letters refer to the respective rates of the stocks
concerned. Thus e~,e2, and r refer to the rate of employment of primary workers, the rate
of employment of secondary workers, and the proportion of the labour force on labour-
market programmes, respectively.) The vacancy rate is denoted by v-V~L. We let
9- V~.í' represent labour-market tightness. An increase in B implies an increase in labour-
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market tightness, and vice-versa. We further let q- H~V represent the rate at which
vacant jobs are filled. Due to the constant returns to scale assumption we have
q(B~ - h(.5'~V,l~ - h~I~B,I~, where c~'(B~ ~ 0. The flow of new hires into jobs is given as
H- aS', where a-~H~V~~V~.S'~ - q~B~B . The function a~B~ is increasing in its
argument.
Since N- a5' - a~ll~ f c(I,~, it is clear that H~V - aU~ ~V f ac(IZ~V . The first term,
all~~~', is in fact the rate at which a vacant job is filled by a primary worker whilst the
second term, acUZ ~V , is the rate at which a vacant job is filled by a secondary worker.
Denoting the rates at which vacant jobs become filled by primary and secondary workers
as q~ and q~, respectively, allows us to write the following identity c~ - y~ ty2.
Furthermore, we can view both q~ and q~ as some portion of q. By setting q~ - yrH~V
and q, - ~] - yr~H~V , we arrive at the following identities:
4~ - C ll' ~q~B~ and q, - ~ ~~I' ~q~B~11~ tcl1. U~ tcll,
We assume that regular job offers arrive according to a Poisson process. The arrival rate
for a worker in 11~ is a, whilst the arrival rate for a worker in UZ is ca. Thus if c ~ 1,
then the arrival rate of job offers to an unemployed secondary worker is lower than that of
an unemployed primary worker. In our model, places on labour-market programmes are
only available to secondary workers in unemployment. Oftèrs for placements on labour-
market programmes arrive according to a Poisson process with parameter y. Notice that
in this model tliere is no on-the-job search.
~ and a are the exogenously given rates at which regular jobs held by primary and
secondary workers break up, respectively. Placements on labour-market programmes
break up at a rate ~ which is government-determined. Since we consider labour-market
programmes to be temporary in this chapter, we assume both that rr~ ~ and that rr~ o~,
i.e. that placements on labour-market programmes break up at a faster rate than either of
the regular employment categories. We assume that n is also bounded from above since
labour-market programmes are used to reliabilitate secondary workers back into the
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primary labour force. If the length of time spent on a labour market programme were too
short, then the possibility that a labour market programme would transform a secondary
worker into a primary workers would be zero.
A worker will find themself in one of five possible labour-force states: primary
employment (E~ ); secondary employment ( L-Z); primary unemployment; secondary
unemployment; and on labour-market programmes ( Il). A dia'rammatic representation of
our model is given in Figure 4.1, below. The boxes E, , E, ,(~~ , ll, , and R, refer to the
stocks of primary employment, secondaiy employment, primary unemployment, secondary
unemployment, and those on labour-market pro~rammes, respectively. The arrows
represent the flows between tlie stocks. As can be seen, there is only one route of exit
from the primary labour force to the secondary labour force: that of flowing from primary
unemployment into secondary unemployment. However, there are two ways of leaving the
secondary labour force to enter the primary labour force. The worker can either exit from
secondary employment; or they can gain a place on a labour-market pro~ramme and from
there enter tlie primary labour force. Either way, the act of gaining either a secondary job
or a placement on a labour-market programme has the possibility of rehabilitating the
worker into the primaiy labour force. Though this is not ~uaranteed. We allow for the
possibility that a worker taking secondary employment or a place on a labour-market
programme may fail to be transformed. Thus a worker may enter a labour-market
programme, for example, only to tind that they exit back into the secondary rather than the
primary labour force. This is in sharp contrast to Chapter 3, where all workers who










For a steady-state equilibrium, we require that the flows into a stock equal the flows out
of the said stock. Thus we have the followin~ equations:
[1] ~'1 - arrl
[2] (a f~.~rr, - 4x, f frar, f r~m-
[3] acZ - carrZ
[4] (ca f y~tr, -~ I- fr~ae, t~rr, t ~r(1- i~~r.
[5] m - Nr,
(We also have the identity 1- e ~ t e~ t ni t trz t r.)
The above equations determine the various proportions of the stocks, given B. (Note that
we have a- a(B~.) To obtain the value of H, we must look at how wages and vacancies
'~ We asswue that c~ 0. since equalih implies that labour-market programmes must ahvays be in use.
This would clearh be unrcasonabla ~tnd would prcveiu us from analysing the difference belween
simulations with and tvithout labour-iuarket progranuncs. We also assume Ihat ft ~ 0, since ft - 0
would imply that if there c~ists any (low from ll~ iuto U, then, eventually, rill of the labour force would
eud up in secondary employment and secoud~iry unentploymeut when labour-market programmes were
not in use.
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are determined. Essentially there are two sides to the wage barDain: the firm's side; and
the worker's. Firstly, we shall look at the firm's side.
We assume that all firms are small. Each firm has only one job which is either occupied or
vacant. All vacancies are the same. They can be filled by either a primary worker or a
secondary worker. In this model, firms are able to distinguish between primary and
secondary workers. There is complete infonnation in this model. Furthermore, there is no
complementarity in production between primary and secondary workers. Thus, if we
crowd out secondary employment, for example, this will not affect the productivity of
those in primary employment.
A job filled by a primary worker lias an expected present value to the firm of J~,~, whilst a
job filled by a secondary worker has an expected present value to the finn of J~i2. A
vacant job yields an expected present value to the tinn of J,,. Letting d represent the
discount rate, y the constant marginal product of a primary worker, n a multiplicative term
between zero and one to represent the possibility of lower productivity of a secondary
worker due to their susceptibility to skill loss, and k the cost of maintaining a vacancy,
then J~,~, J~,Z, and J„ satisty the following equations:
[6] a~~~~ - Y - ia~~ } ~.1,, - J„~ ~
[7] àl,,, - cry - N', t Q~a,, - J~, ~
[g] c~l,. - -k f q~ ~'~~~~~~~ - J„~ t q~ ~'~~J~,, - .I,,~
(~~, and i~~, refer to the wages of primary and secondary workers, respectively.)
As can be seen, a vacancy involves a cost per period of k and is turned into an occupied
job either at the rate q,~.~ for a primary worker or q,~.~ for a secondary worker.
Vacancies are kept open for as long as they yield a positive profit. Due to the small firm
assumption, .I„ - 0 in equilibrium. The value of a job occupied by a primary worker is
found from [6] to be J~,, -(y -„~, ~~(d t Q,~ , and the value of a job occupied by a
secondary worker is found from [7] to be J~, - ~cry -~~, ~~~8f Q~ . Substituting
J~,~ and .I~i2 into [8] yields the zero-protit condition for firms
[9] ~d t~~~5 f Q~k - 9~ ~'~~J' - i,~~ ~~ó f Q~ f ~~,~'~~"y - N'~ ~~~ }~~
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But why would a firm ever till a vacancy with a secondary worker when there are primary
workers in the labour market looking for employment? Quite simply, the reason for filling
a job with a secondary worker is that the other option open to the firm is to wait for a
primary worker to come along and fill the vacancy. The choice is not between filling the
position with a secondary worker and tilling the position with a primary worker, but rather
between filling the vacancy with a secondary worker or leaving the vacancy unfilled. Thus
the tirm chooses to employ secondary workers.
Having discussed the firm's side of the wage bargain, we shall now discuss the worker's
side of the story before making the bargaining scheme explicit. Since there are five
possible labour-market states for a worker to tind themself in, there are five possible value
functions. We let n~i , n~2 , n„i , n„Z , and n,. represent the expected discounted
lifetime income for workers in primary employment, secondary employment, primary
unemployment, secondary unemployment, and labour-market programmes, respectively.
The value functions are as follows:
~ 10~ Sn~., - w~ t~(n,,, - n,., )
~11~ ~n,,, -p,,,~fa(n,,, -n,,,)t~(n, -
~12~ an,,, -,~, t ~,~(n,,, - n~., ) } (I - f~)6(n,..
~I~~ an, -p,N~f~a(n,. -n,,,)}y(n,-n,,,)
~14~ an~ - p,,,, t ~~~(n„ - n,) f(1- ~i)~(n,,, - n, ),
(Where tii~ - ( ~, . N~, t e, . i,~, ~~(e~ t ~,) is the average wage )
As can be seen, benetits to primaiy workers in unemployment are linked to the average
wage via the replacement ratio p~, whilst unemployment benefits to secondary workers in
unemployment and pay to those on labour-market programmes are both linked to the
avera~e wage via p2 and p,. respectively. All replacement ratios lie between zero and one.
The model exhibits incentive compatibility in that the discounted expected lifetime income
from holding a regular job is always higher than the value of being unemployed. Since we
direct labour-market programmes at those secondary workers in unemployment, we
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require that A, ~ A~Ï . Notice that we do not require that A,. ~ A„i, since labour-market
programmes are targeted purely at those in secondary unemployment.
The wage of both primary and secondary workers is assumed to be the result of a Nash
bargain. For workers in the primary labour force, the Nash bargain in a particular firm r
solves
max~.,, ~~~'~-[n~.,,~"'~,~- ,, ~~~.I~,~, ~,,,,, ~-.I, ~~-~
O~A~I
where A„ is the fall-back value for primary workers should they not gain regular
employment. The outcome of this Nash bargain is the following wage equation:
[ 1 1] tii~i - y- r
1- Al~b
t~~~ n,., - n „~ ~L A J
where the equilibrium conditions u~~. - i.~~~ and J„ - 0 are imposed. For workers in the
secondary labour force, the Nash bargain solves
tnax 52.~.~-f ~1, ~u~, )-A,,.~~[J,, (i~~, )-J,.~~-~i O~B~1
where A,,, is tLhe fall-back value for secondary workers should they not gain regular
employment This Nash bargain yields the following wage equation:
[ 12] ,~~, - ~ry - ~ 1 BBl(a ~ ~)~A~~~ - ~~-- ~
where again the equilibriiJim conditions ti~~, - w, and J„ - 0 are imposed. As can be seen,
any policy which reduces the discounted expected income difference A~~ - Au~ ,.j - 1,2,
will increase ii~~ .
The complete model consists of sixteen equations, namely the flow-equilibrium conditions
[1] -[S], the zero-profit condition [9], the value functions [10] -[14], and the two wage
equations [11] and [12]. In addition, we have a- a~B~, q, -~rr,~~~r, fcu,~~q~B~, and
g, -~cuZ~~rr, f cir,~~q~B~. These equations determine the endogenous variables:
~'I, ~2. rrl, rr2, r'~ a. B, ~Il, 92, Ac~ , Ac2 , Aui , Ar,2 , A,., i.i~~ , and i~~2.
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4.3 Comp~rative statics
In this section, we show the comparative statics of the model. Since a change in the policy
parameter y has both a direct effect on the size of a stock and an indirect effect on a stock
throuDh its influence on labour-market tightness B, we show both the derivative of the
stocks with respect to y and the derivative of the stocks with respect to labour-market
tishtness e. The comparative statics of the model are as follows: c~, ~~y g0 ; d~ ~ó6~ 0;
t~2~ó!'~0: ~,~r~9~0; ~~i~~~yg0; ~3i,~~~9~0; c~i2~c~Y~O; c~iz~óB~O; c3~~óy~0;
d.~~B~ 0.
The derivative of the various stocks with respect to the policy paratneter y, show the
qualitative relationship between tlie stock concerned and the policy parameter when
labour-market tightness B is held constant. Also shown is the derivative of the various
stocks with respect to B, i.e., the indirect efiect. As can be seen, the direct effect of an
increase in the flow into labour-market programmes is to increase e~, ti~, and i-, and to
reduce r2 and ti~. However, to gain the overall qualitative etïèct of an increase in y on a
stock's size, we must see what happens to B and how this affects the stock. We find that
we are unable to sián the relationsliip between y and B, i.e. BY~O t~. Thus the proportion
of each of these stocks can either increase, decrease, or remain unchanged when the value
of y is changed. To see clearly what happens when the flow out of secondary
unemployment and into labour-market programmes is increased, we need to resort to
some numerical simulations.
t~ This is difficult to pro~e anal}licall~. Ho~~ever, simul:ttions were uudertaken which confinn th~t the
sign of thc rclaliouship is ambiguous. Dct:uls a~ ailablc trom thc author on requcst.
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4.4 Some simulations
In this section, we show examples of simulations which we have undertaken. These
simulations include skill loss and lower search intensity as well as the possibility that
taking a regular job or a place on a labour-market programme may not transform the
secondary worker into a primary worker. Each simulation starts from a base run without
labour-market programmes. From this base run, we increase the flow from secondary
unemployment onto labour-market programmes. As with the last chapter, we use the same
parameter values as Holmlund 8c Lindén where appropriate. For the other values, we
attempt to use values which we consider to be both realistic and plausible.
In our simulations, we also analyse how total production in the economy may be affected
by using labour-market programmes. Using the following definition of total production
7P-e~y~ fe,y, tiy, -i~k
where y, , y. , and y, denote the production of a worker in e~ , e„ and ~~, respectively,
we give some idea as to how total production changes. In the following tables, TP,
indicates total production for the economy where those on labour-market programmes are
totally unproductive, i.e. Tf; -e,yfc,ay-,~k. "II;, on the other hand, gives a measure
for total production in the economy where those on labour-market programmes are as
productive as those in secondary employment, i.e. TI;-e~ y f~e, t r~cry -,~k .
4.4.1 No skill loss but lower search intensity. SO'~~ ch~nce of exiting into the primary
I~bour force from secondary employment and labow~-mnrket progr~mmes.
In this section, we look at an example where there is no skill loss, i e cr1.0, but search
intensity is lower amongst those in secondary unemployment. In this example, we let
c-0.5. A secondary worker in either regular employment or on a labour-market
programme has a fifty percent chance of exiting into the primary labour force. We start
with a base run where there are no labour-market programmes, and gradually increase the




Y ci c, tii tt, r v B i~~i N~Z TPi TP,
0.0 80,O11 1(1.00 6.00 4.00 0.00 2.07 O.Zí9 IOO.oO 100.00 100.00 100.00
0.OO1 81.72 7.87 C.id 3.36 0.?0 L91 0.232 99-97 I00.72 99.71 10028
0.(I(12 R2.98 C.-l0 6.92 2.8~ 0.8~ 1.81 0.217 99.9G 101.22 99.57 100.54
O.(IOi 8j.ld -F.02 7.í2 1.89 1.~2 1.67 0.197 99.97 102.02 99.47 101.08
0.01 8(.65 2.~15 7.91 1.19 1.79 1.i9 0.186 99.98 102.56 99.49 101.52
0.112 87.73 1.37 8.17 0.C8 2.0~ 1.54 (1.180 99.99 102.94 9254 101.87
O.pi 88.i3 O.S9 8.36 0.3(1 2.22 1.i0 (1.176 100.01 I(13.21 99.61 102.13
0.1 88.83 0.30 R.a2 O.li 229 1.49 0.17i 100.02 103.31 99.63 102.23
0,5 89.09 u.OG 8.48 U.03 2.34 1.~18 0.174 Io0.02 Io3.4o 99.66 102.32
We set q- nr(1-O'4 and k - i~~ ~ . The followiug parameter values pertain to this table: A- (1.75051093 ;
B-O.[i978~026tK: p,-O.G: pt-p2-0.5; y-11~: ~-O.Oi~36i; ~-1~2400; ~-1~1080;
~r - I~IiU: 6- 1~9(10: m -(LU12i. Thc initial ~alucs of tv and tv are 112.i and 10G.11, respectively.
t z
e, e u, u , r, and v. are all gi~~eu as percentages of the labour force. rv , iv , TP ,and T!' , are all
t 2' t z t z t 2
given as indices with the value in the basc nin set equal to 100.00.
As can be seen, the general etTect of an increase in the flow into labour-market
pro~ratntnes in this scenario is an increase in the pritnary labour force, a decrease in the
secondary labour force, and a slight reduction in total unemployment. Total production
decreases if y, - 0, and increases if y, -uy. Whether labour-market programmes are
considered successful here largely depends on whether those on labour-tnarket
programmes are productive or not.
4.4.2 Skill loss ~nd lower search intensity. 100'Y~ cho-tnce of exiting into the prim~ry
labour force from secondary employment; SO'~~ ch~nce of exiting into the primary
I~bour force from I~bour-market progr,tmmes.
In this section, we look at an example of a labour market which exhibits both skill loss and
lower search intensity amongst those in the secondary labour force. We assume that those
in secondary employment are eighty percent as productive as those in primary
employment, i.e. n-0.8, and that those in secondary unemployment only search fifty
percent as intensively as those in primary unemployment, i.e. c-0.5. A secondary worker
in regular employment has a 100a~o chance of exitin~ into the primary labour force, whilst
Ik The values of the firm- aud union-po~~er c.~ponentials in the Nash bargain ha~~e bceu chosen so as to set
lbe unemploymcnt and cmplo~menl r~UCS at c~act ~alucs in the base runs. This allows simpler
contparisons bctweeu the base nm and thc subscqucnt equilibrium to be made. This is [rue for all
simulalions.
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a secondary worker on a labour-tnarket programme has a fifty percent chance of exiting
into the primary labour force. We start with a base run where there are no labour-market
programmes, and gradually increase the flow into the programmes. Table 4.3 shows us
what happens:
Table 4.3
Y e, e, n~ i~, r v B n~, w~ TPi TPZ
o.0 80.00 lo.oo G.oo ~.oo o.o0 1.2x o.lr~o loo.oo loaoo loaoo loo.oo
0.(1O1 80.19 9.21 6.21 3.81 O.i7 1.23 0.152 99.99 100.35 99.55 100.08
0.(102 80.40 8.i0 G.40 3.(I 1.08 1.19 0.145 99.99 100.6G 99.IR IOO.l7
0.005 8L00 G.80 C.B~ 3.(IG 2.30 1.10 0.132 99.98 101.37 98.40 100.51
O.O1 8L82 5.00 7.2G 2.37 3.ii l.(12 0.121 99.99 102.09 97.7G 101.03
0.02 82.80 3.22 7.6-1 I.iB ~1.7i p.9(i ( 1.113 100.01 102.78 97.32 101.70
0.05 83.89 1.9; 7.9~1 0.78 í.Ri 0.91 (1.109 IOO.n4 103.41 97.08 102.47
(Ll 8~1.40 0.83 8.OG 0.~2 G.30 U.89 0.1(17 10(L06 IOl.6R 97.03 102.83
U.~ 8d.89 0.17 8.1i (LO9 6.70 0.87 O.IOG l00.117 IIt3.92 97.00 103.18
We se( q- n~0~t 4 amd k - i)~~, . Thc followiug par)meter valucs pertain to this table: A- 0.86462813 ;
i3-0.8(18841; p, -(1.6: p) -pz -U.i; y- 11~: J-(1.l)i,3hi; ~- I~IG00; i.- 1~3G0; ir-1,150;
a- 1~G(10: rn - 0.(12i . The initial ~ alues of ~r and ~r are 113.i and 87.31, respectively. e, e , u,
I 2 I 2 1
u r, :tnd i~. are aIl given as percentages of lhe labour force. w,,v , TP ,and TP , are all given as
z' t z t z
indices wilh the v~tlue in the base nin sa cqua l0 100.00.
Again, using labour-market programmes leads to an increase in the primary labour force
and a decrease of the secondary labour f'orce. Total unemployment initially increases very
slightly before declining with increased tlows onto labour-tnarket programmes. As with
the previous example, whether rotal production increases or decreases depends strongly
on whether those on labour-market pro~rammes are productive or not.
4.4.3 Skill loss and lower search intensity. 50'~~ ch;ince of exiting from secondary
employment into the primary Iabow. force; 100'Y~ chance of exiting from a labour-
market p~rogr~mme into the prim;u.y labour force.
In this section, the productivity and search intensity of secondary workers is the same as in
the imtnediately preceding example. This time, however, secondary workers in regular
employment have a tifty percent chance of exitin~ into the primary labour force whilst
those on labour-market programmes have a 1000~o chance of leaving the secondary labour
force. Thus, here, labour-market programmes are completely successful in transforming
secondary workers into pritnary workers. This is in contrast to regular jobs for secondary
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workers, which give the worker a fifty percent chance of exiting into the primary labour
force. Table 4.4 gives us the results:
Table 4.4
Y e~ e, rr~ ir, r v 6 N'~ )v, TP~ TP2
o.o xo.oo to-ou ~.o0 4.00 0.0o zo7 o.zs9 )oo.no loo.oo loo.oo loo.oo
0.0(11 81.33 G.79 7.8i 3.í(1 (Li2 1.63 (Ll7(1 99.95 105.43 99.03 99.51
OA02 82.82 ~.82 8.80 2.73 0.82 1.~7 O.l4i Ioo.OO 107.94 99.10 99.86
O.OOi 87.35 0.00 9.?G 1.77 1.33 1.32 U.138 IuU.21 - 100.03 101.26
QO1 87.71 0.(10 9.98 0.92 1.39 1.29 U.129 100.26 - 100.48 101.77
0.02 87.89 0.00 1(1.22 0.47 1.42 1.27 0.125 IO0.29 - U)O.71 I02.03
O.Oj 88.00 0.00 10.37 0.19 1.1~1 1.26 0.122 100.31 - 100.84 102.18
0.1 88.04 0.00 10.42 0.10 I.-tí L26 U.121 I(10.31 - 100.89 102.24
0.~ R8.(17 0.(10 1(1.46 0.(12 L~lí L26 0.120 IU(r..12 - 100.93 102.28
We set q- nr0~); and k - w,. The follo~cing parametcr values pertain to this table: A-O.79652GG9 ;
B-0.68219i87: pr-O.G: p1-pz-0.~: y-115: J-Q05,3G5: ~-I,2400: .1-1,1080;
zr - 1,150 ; 6- 1,900 ; rn - O.O l2i . The initial valucs of ~r and iv are l 12.5 and 83.49, respectively.
) z
e, e rr , n , r, and i~. are all given as percentages of thc labour force. iv . w , TP ,and TP , are all
( z' ) z ) z ) 2
given as indices with the value in the base run sct cqual (0 100.(lu.
The consequence of increasing the flow into labour-market programmes is to increase the
proportion of workers in the primary labour force and to decrease the proportion of
workers in the secondary labour force. Notice that when y- 0.005 and above, secondary
employment is completely crowded out. This is due to the fact that the worker in
secondary unemployment has a higher expected lifetime income than if they were to enter
secondary employment, i.e. i1,,, ~ A~, . The total unemployment rate is higher for all
levels of labour-market programme usage.
Looking at what liappens to total production, we see that for low values of y, total
production is lower than in the base ntn. However at values of 0.005 and above it is
higher, even when those on labour-market programmes are completely unproductive. The
increase of primary employment and the reduction in vacancies is more than enough to
offset the loss of production from secondary employment.
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4.4.4 Skill loss and lower search intensity. 50'I~ ch~nce of exiting from secondary
employment iuto the primary labour force; 100'~~ chance of exiting from a labour-
market progr~mme into tlie prim:lry labour force.
In this section, we see a labour market similar to that analysed in Section 4.4.3 except that
skill loss is even more pronounced. Secondary workers are 700~o as productive as their
primary counterparts, rather than 800~o as in the previous example, i.e. cr0.7 here, rather
than a-0.8. Table 4.5 below shows us what happens.
Table 4.5
Y c, e, u~ :~, r v 6 N~~ tii~, TPi TPz
0.0 70.1111 20.00 6.011 4.00 0.(10 2.07 0.259 IOOAO 10(1.00 100.00 100.00
0.001 72.71 1~1.3(1 R.j(1 3.90 O.i9 1.G1 O.li; 99.96 1(W.2~ 9A.90 99.40
0.(102 83.66 0.(1(1 10.20 4.72 L42 L47 (1.1~4 100.41 - 100.13 IOL34
0.(105 84.89 0.(10 l Ld l 2.1 1 I.~R 1.40 (L I22 100.55 - 101.71 103.06
0.01 85.32 0.(10 1 L92 I.III LCC l. ~7 0.11~ 100.(,0 - IO2.26 103.67
0.02 8i.i3 0.00 12.21 11.i7 L70 1.3i ll.lll II)0.G3 - 102.54 103.99
0.05 85.GG 0.O0 12. ;9 l).2 3 1.72 I. ~~t 0.11)8 100 (5 - 102.71 104.18
0.1 85.71 0.(l0 12.4~ 11-IZ L73 1.34 O.IU7 I~~u-66 - I))2-77 104.24
U.~ Si 71 u.UU 12.~u U-U2 L7~ I?l l) In7 luu t,b - Iu2 Rl 1u4-29
We set q- m(1~) 4 and k - ii~,,. The follo~~ing parame(cr valucs pertain to lhis table: A-(1.81075038;
L3-0.73iG0319: p~-O.6: p)-p2-0.i: v-11~: J-l).Oi,3Gi; ~-1,2100; .i-1~1080;
~r - l~ I i0 : a- I~ 181N): nr - O.012i . Thc iui(ial ~alues of u~ and r~~ are 1120 and 77.21, respectively.
) z
e, e u, u , r. and i~. are all givcu as perccu(agcs of the labour force. w. ir . TP .and TP , are all
) z' ) 2 t z ) z
gi~~en as iudices ~~ith the ~aluc in the b;isc run set equnl (o IOU.O(1
Here, we see tliat by increasing the value of y, we increase the proportion of those in the
primary labour force whilst we decrease the proportion of those in the secondary labour
force, just as in the previous examples. Total unemployment is higher when labour-market
programmes are used. Notice that secondary unemployment decreases when y is
increased to 0.001, increases when y is increased to 0.002, but again continues to
decrease when y is increased still furtl)er. This erratic behaviour of secondary
unemployment is due to the fact tliat when y is increased to 0.001, it is still incentive
compatible for the secondary worker in unemployment to accept a regular job. However,
when y is increased to 0.002 ( and higher values), secondary employment is completely
crowded out since n~: ~ n~, . As a result, there is a sudden halt to the flow from (Iz into
E, . Consequently secondary unemployment increases, despite the fact that there is an
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increased flow out of secondary unemployment into labour-market programmes. When y
is increased still further, secondary unemployment again continues to fall since secondary
employment cannot be crowded out any more.
Notice that both measures of total production show an initial decline before increasing.
Even if those on labour-market programmes are completely unproductive, total
production is hi~her than in the base run since the more-productive primary employment is
crowded in at the expense of the less-productive secondary employment. Furthermore,
vacancies decline meaning that less productive potential is spent on maintaining vacancies.
Thus, even though total employment is lower when labour-market programmes are in
existence, the level of total production is still hi~her
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4.4.5 Skill loss but no reduction in search intensity. l00"~~ chance of exiting from
secondary employment into the primary labour force; 10~~~ chance of exiting from a
labour-market programme into the primary labour force.
In this, our final example, there is skill loss present but no reduction in search intensity.
Thus in this example, cr-0.8 and c-1.0. Those secondary workers in regular employment
have a 1000~o chance of exiting into the primary labour force, i.e. f~ - 1.0, whilst those on
labour-market programmes have only a l0a~o chance of exiting into the primary labour
force, i.e. r~ - 0.1. Table 4.6 shows us what happens when labour-market programmes are
used:
Table 4.6
Y e~ e, rri rr, r v B t~', t~~, "IY, TP,
o.0 8o.uu lo.oo G.oo a.ou o.o0 1.GO o.IGO ioo.ott lou.uo loaoo too.oo
(1.(I(Il 79.i.1 9.88 G.(I(1 3.9R U.GIt 1.i8 U.li9 IOU-00 10(1.09 99.38 99.94
0.002 79.09 9.77 G.O(1 i.9i 1.19 1.?6 O.Ij7 IQ0.00 10(1.19 98.78 99.87
O.OOS 77.77 9.43 6.01 3.8R 2.91 l.~l 0.1?3 99.99 100.47 9G.99 99.69
OAI 7~.G7 R.89 G.OI 3.77 i.6i 1.42 0.14G 99.98 10093 94.1G 99.40
0.02 71.86 7.92 G.03 3.ij 111.G~ 1.27 0.133 99.97 101.8? 89.03 98.87
QOi G3.37 i,73 G.07 2.92 21.~)2 0.9G 0.1(17 99.95 I(W.13 77.51 97.79
0.1 56.~11 3.71 G.03 2.12 31.73 0.72 0.089 99.97 InG.45 G7.86 97.22
O.i i0.34 0.9J i.GG U.i7 42.48 (t.íl 0.(182 luo.l(1 10948 ~8.~2 97.83
We set q- ru(l-(t'~ and k- n~,. The follo~~ing par:tmetcr ~alues pertain to this table: A- 0.87091801;
B-(1.7(1512G9j; Pr-(t`)~ P(-P2 -Uj; v- II~: v-0.(Ii,3Gi; ~-1~1G0(1; .ï-1~180;
n- 1,1 i(1; v- 1~30(1; „r -(LO2i . TLc initial ~ alucs oC u~ and ,r are I 13.5 and R3.86, respectively.t z
e e, u, u , r. and r. are all gi~ en as percentagcs of the labour force. ir . m , TP ,and TP , are all
t' z t z t z t z
given as indiccs ~cith thc ~ aluc in the basc run scl equal to 10(1.(1(1.
Starting from an initial situation where total unemployment is l0a~o, we see that by
increasing the number of workers on labour-market programmes, we further reduce
unemployment. However, whilst we reduce both primary and secondary unemployment,
we also reduce both primary and secondary employment. Regular employment is
significantly crowded out by labour-market programmes. As a result of this crowding out,
both measures oftotal production decline; Tf; signiticantly.
This example shows that the usage ot' labour-market programmes in this scenario is a
failure. Regular employment declines, as does total production. Furthennore, unlike in all
Skill Loss 117
of the previous examples, the proportion of workers in the primary labour force declines.
Thus the aim of transforming secondary workers into primary workers, fails.
4.5 Conclusion
From the preceding analysis it is paintully clear that the usage of labour-market
programmes in the model which we have specified in this chapter is not an unmitigated
success. Five examples of labour markets were given in Section 4.4; each of these
indicated varying results when labour-market programmes were directed at secondary
workers in unemployment.
In four of the examples above, there was a possibility that total production in the economy
could be increased by the usage of labour-market programmes. However, this increase
was not guaranteed in any of the examples. Total production tended to increase when skill
loss existed amongst secondaiy workers and when those on labour-market programmes
were as productive as those in secondary employment. Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4 2 illustrate
how whether those on labour-market programmes are as productive as those in secondary
employment or totally unproductive affects whether introducing labour-market
programmes has a positive or a negative effect on total production. ln Section 4.4.5,
where labour-market programmes crowd out all other states in the labour market, total
production declines slightly when those on labour-market programmes are as productive
as those in secondary employment, but declines drastically when those on labour-market
programmes are unproductive. Thus whether total production increases or decreases when
labour-market programmes are introduced often depends on whether those on labour-
market programmes are productive or not.
In Sections 4.4.3 and 4.4.4, we see situations when secondary employment is completely
crowded out by the usage of labour-market programmes. This is due to the fact that it is
more-appealing for the secondary worker to be in unemployment rather than in
employment, i.e. n,,. ~ n~, . Despite this total crowding out of regular employment for
secondary workers, total production increases, even if those on labour-market
programmes are completely unproductive. This is due to two things: Firstly, there is an
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increase in the number of workers in primary employment, where workers are fully
productive; and, secondly, there is a reduction in the number of vacancies. Since
maintaining vacancies involves using up a certain amount of the productive potential of the
economy, any reduction in the number of vacancies increases the total production of the
economy.
All in all, we tind that the unqualified usage of labour-market programmes in the context
given, is not guaranteed to give wholly positive results. If a policy maker wishes to use
labour-market pro~rammes in the manner sug~ested in this chapter, then they must decide
whether to do so in full knowled~e of the parameter values of the model. Only then can
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If we set r~ - 0 and f~ - 1, then ~c2, ~~y~ ~ 0. However, if we set rJ - 1 and ~N- ii
sufficiently low enough, then ~~,~~9y~1 - ~0. Since nothing precludes this differentialN n





Differentiating [A2] with respect to y, yields the following:
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Differentiating [A3] with respect to y yields
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When i~ - 0, we find that ~~i, ~r?y~l ~ 0 . However, when ~~ - I and ~ is low enough,
N-N
we find that ~~;i'~, ~~3y~1 --~ ~ 0. Since nothing precludes this differential from being equal to





Differentiating [AS] with respect to y yields
c~i,
~
Q~~r~~r t Q,~ f ai~n~
- -i~, ~ 0- l,.
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Differentiating [A4] with respect to y yields
~-y -~~,~ ~caQ~~. f ca~i~~~ f ~.i~ t ca' f~Q~ ~ 0
N-N
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Since a'~B~ ~ 0, this implies that sign~r~tock~c?a~ - sign~~tock~á9~ . Therefore, if we
can find the differential of a labour-market stock with respect to a, then we can tell from
its sign whether that stock will increase with an increase in B or otherwise.
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Differentiatin~ [A 1] with respect to a gives us
~, ~~Q
~~ - ~,,
caf~ {ca.ín t 2yiJ~rQ f caf~~rQ f 2~,~~y f~~1
f n~Q{r~~~ f ~.(y f ~)}
Differentiating [A2] with respect to a yields the following:
~~, Qr~Y~1~ ~~~y trr~- e, -IL f - caf~~r
c?a - V a a
Differentiating [A3] with respect to a gives us
c3i, ~i~rQ cfrQ{~i~ ~y f ~r~ - ca' fi~c - 2ayi~~r}
c7a - V' - yi~n~c~.i f yi~6~
Ifwe set i~ - 0, and N sufticiently low, then ~3~~ ~~a ~ 0. However, if we have r~ - 1 and
~ sufiiciently low then ~~~, ~~'a ~ 0. Since nothing precludes this differential from being
equal to zero, we have the following:
c~ii~ ~0
~a `
Differentiating [AS] with respect to a yields
~--~~ ~cQ~~ ~r t cQ,~~~rv f 2cafincst yi~~r6~ ~ 0
Differentiating [A4] with respect to a yields
~--~~c~.1~r f c~~r~rQ t 2cafinQ f yiJ~rQ~ ~ 0
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Summary
This thesis uses matching models to analyse the impact of labour-market programmes on
regular employment, unemployment, taxes, wage formation, and current and expected
income. Based on theoretical macroeconomic analyses, investigations are made of the
positive and negative consequences of labour-market policy, sometimes linked to
measures concerning taxes and social benefits. In the cases where there are theoretically
no unambiguous outcomes, policy simulations are undertaken. For policy parameters, we
attempt to use realistic and plausible values.
The basic model is a matching model of the labour market where there are three stocks:
regular employment; labour-market pro~rammes; and unemployment. This model is based
on the model used by Holmlund 8c Lindén (1993). Individuals can tlow from one group to
another. The amount of people who flow within a certain period into regular employment
is determined by a matching fiinction. On the one hand, this amount depends on the supply
(i.e. the number of unemployed and the number on programmes, and their search
intensities) and on the other hand, it depends on demand (i.e. the number of vacancies).
Vacancies are influenced by wage costs. Wages are determined by negotiations between
individual firms and workers. The outcome of these negotiations depends, upon other
things, on the number of unemployed, the number of participants on programmes, and on
the income in the case of unemployment or programme participation.
Because labour-market programmes increase the outflow possibilities of the unemployed,
they can have a positive intluence on wages. For this reason, programmes may have a
negative influence on regular employment, known as crowding out. A major goal of this
thesis is to investigate in what sense crowding out is an important problem, and which
combination of policy measures is suited to avoid this problem and result in crowding in
instead ofcrowding out.
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In Chapter 2, the basic model is analysed. In it, the level of payroll taxes is endogenous
and the tax rate is chosen such that the goveriunent can exactly finance benefits and wages
on labour-market programmes. The next important difference between our model and that
ofHolmlund R Lindén is that account is taken of the fact that participants on programmes
have a diftèrent fall-back position. If programme participants have a higher pennanent
income than the unemployed (and this will be the case, if they voluntarily take programme
places), this means that wages ofworkers in regular employment who have entered from a
programme will be higher than those of workers entering from unemployment. In Chapter
2, however, emphasis is put on programmes which are unattractive enough that no one
will volunteer to take them. Although the wage on programmes is higher than
unemployment benefits, programme participants are not able to search as intensively for a
regular job as those in unemployment. If this last difference dominates, then their
permanent income when participating on a programme will be lower than if they were
unemployed. They will, in that case, prefer to stay unemployed and search actively for a
job, rather than participating on a programme which reduces their chance of gaining a
regularjob.
The labour-market programme acts as a social safety net in this case, in that it guarantees
the participants a minimum income. The necessity of unemployment benefits at the
minimum level disappears because the unemployed can choose to enter a programme
where the income is at least the social minimum. The analysed policy measures therefore
concern combinations of labour-market programmes and a reduction in unemployment
benefits. Although the unemployed are worse off at first instance, because of the reduction
in unemployment benefits, it is shown using simulations that, for plausible parameter
values and suitable combinations of policy measures, the policy can lead to an equilibrium
with higher regular employment, lower taxes, and higher expected income for the
unemployed as well as those in regular employment. In this equilibrium, no one chooses a
programme.
For the analysis above, a number of assumptions are crucial. One assumption is that
individuals only consider permanent income and are not liquidity-constrained. In the final
part of Chapter 2, in a somewhat heuristic manner, we investigate what the path to
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equilibrium looks like if liquidity constraints do play a role. It appears that in the short
term, measures can have a negative ettect on regular employment, and that crowding in
may only take place after some time.
In Chapters 3 and 4, the basic model is extended so that we take into account the
possibility that participating on a programme may have a positive effect on the search
intensity of the unemployed and the chance that they will find a job. In Chapter 3,
programmes restore the contact of the long-term unemployed with the labour market, so
that they can search again for a regular job. A distinction is made between effective and
inefhective unemployment. The effective unemployed have a higher chance of gaining a
regular job. An increase in the numbers in effective unemployment means that vacancies
are filled more quickly. And this can lead to higher regular employment due to the
matching process. The results of the simulation analyses in this chapter show that for some
policy variants, regular employment can increase whilst for other variants, crowding out
can take place. Positive effects are especially reached by variants of policies analysed in
Chapter 2 where unemployment benetits are decreased and programmes act as a social
safety net.
In Chapter 4, another realistic feature is added to the model. In this chapter, it is assumed
that programmes, as well as experience in a regular job, can increase the human capital of
participants. However, we assume that not all programmes and regular jobs are necessarily
successful in this respect. For some individuals, participating on a programme does not
affect their level of human capital. One can think of inferior jobs that do not develop a
worker's skills and knowledge. The simulation results also show that no unambiguous
results can be obtained, and that results depend on parameter values and the quality of the
work in the programmes. It is even possible that programmes only lead to increased
unemployment with lower productivity, so that the opposite is reached from what
programmes aim for. This will be the case if much substituted labour is inferior and does
not lead to the desired increase of human capital.
Studies in this thesis show tliat active labour-market policy can have a positive
contribution to decreasing unemployment as well as stimulating regular employment. This
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is definitely the case if it is linked to the policy of taxes and benefits. Good results are
especially obtained in those cases where the programmes are not attractive but function as
a social safety net. Only in this case is an unambiguous positive effect on regular
employment guaranteed. In practice, these sort of proarammes do not look very realistic.
Combinations of several pro~rammes that are attractive for some and unattractive for
others, however, can lead to ~ood results.
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Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift behandelt verschillende modellen waarmee de invloed wordt geanalyseerd
van vervangende werkgelegenheid in de vorm van arbeidsmarktprogramma's op reguliere
werkgelegenheid, werkloosheid, loonvorming, belastingen, en inkomens en
inkomensverwachtingen. Op grond van een theoretische, macro-economische, analyse
worden uitspraken gedaan over de mogelijke positieve en negatieve gevolgen van effectief
arbeidsmarktbeleid, soms gekoppeld aan maatregelen in de sfeer van belastingen en
uitkeringen. Daar waar theoretisch geen eenduidige uitspraken te geven zijn, wordt de
analyse aangevuld met beleidssimulaties, waarbij voor de modelparameters waar mogelijk
plausibele en realistische parameterwaarden gebruikt worden.
Het basismodel is ontleend aan Holmlund en Lindén (1993). Het is een matching-model
van de arbeidsmarkt waarin drie groepen worden onderscheiden: werkenden met een
reguliere baan, participanten in arbeidsmarktprogramrna's, en werklozen op zoek naar een
reguliere baan. Individuen kunnen overgaan van de ene groep naar de andere. Hoeveel
mensen in een bepaalde periode instromen in de reguliere werkgelegenheid, wordt bepaald
door een matchingfunctie. Dit aantal hangt enerzijds af van het aanbod (aantal werklozen,
aantal participanten in programma's, en de zoekintensiteit van beide groepen), en
anderzijds van de vraag, d.w.z het aantal openstaande vacatures. Dit laatste wordt
beïnvloed door de loonkosten. De lonen komen tot stand door onderhandelingen tussen
afzonderlijke ondernemingen en individuele werknemers. De uitkomst van deze
onderhandelingen hangt onder meer af van de aantallen werklozen en participanten in
programma's, en van het inkomen in geval van werkloosheid of deelname aan een
programma.
Omdat arbeidsmarktprogramma's de uitstroomkansen van werklozen verhogen, kunnen ze
een opstuwende werking op de lonen hebben. Daardoor kan zo'n programma ten koste
gaan van de reguliere werkgelegenheid. Dit probleem staat bekend als 'crowding out'. Het
voornaamste doel van het proefschrift is te onderzoeken in hoeverre 'crowding out' een
belangrijk probleem is, en welke combinatie van beleidsmaatregelen geschikt is om dit
probleem te vermijden en in plaats daarvan de reguliere werkgelegenheid te laten
toenemen, d.w.z. 'crowding in' te doen plaatsvinden.
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Hoofdstuk 1 heeft een inleidend karakter. Er wordt kort ingegaan op de rol van actief
arbeidsmarktbeleid ter bestrijding van de werkloosheid, en er worden enkele
vergelijkingen gemaakt tussen Zweden en andere landen. Zweden heeft in het verleden de
meeste energie gestoken in actief arbeidsmarktbeleid, en heeft ook lang een zeer lage
werkloosheid gehad. Empirische studies hebben geen eenduidig antwoord gegeven op de
vraag of tussen deze twee zaken een oorzakelijk verband bestaat.
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt het basismodel nader geanalyseerd. Het tarief van de loonbelasting is
endogeen, en wordt zo hoog gekozen dat de overheid de uitkeringen en de lonen voor
vervangende werkgelegenheid precies kan financieren uit de belastingopbrengsten. Het
belangrijkste verschil in de modelspecificatie met het model van Holmlund en Lindén
(1993) is dat er rekening mee wordt gehouden dat bij de loononderhandelingen werklozen
een andere uitgangspositie hebben dan deelnemers aan een arbeidsmarktprogramma. Als
deelnemers aan een programma een hoger permanent inkomen hebben dan werklozen (en
dit zal het geval zijn als zij vrijwillig aan het programma deelnemen), betekent dit dat de
looneisen van participanten hoger zullen zijn dan die van werklozen. De lonen van
degenen die van een arbeidsmarktprogramma naar een reguliere baan doorstromen, zijn in
het model hoger dan de lonen van degenen die uit werkloosheid instromen.
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt echter met name aandacht besteed aan varianten waarbij de
arbeidsmarktprogramma's zo onaantrekkelijk zijn dat niemand eraan deelneemt. Weliswaar
krijgen programmadeelnemers een loon dat hoger is dan de werkloosheidsuitkering, maar
daar staat tegenover dat zij minder intensief kunnen zoeken naar een reguliere baan. Als
dit laatste verschil domineert, is hun permanente inkomen - de som van de contant
gemaakte verwachte inkomens nu en in de toekomst - bij deelname aan het programma
lager dan in geval van werkloosheid. Zij zullen dan liever werkloos blijven en actief naar
werk zoeken, dan aan het programma deelnemen en hun kans op regulier werk verkleinen.
Het arbeidsmarktprogramma fungeert in die situatie als sociaal vangnet: het garandeert bij
deelname een minimaal inkomen. De noodzaak van een werkloosheidsuitkering op
minimumniveau komt te vervallen, omdat werklozen altijd kunnen kiezen voor deelname
aan een programma met een inkomen van minstens het sociaal minimum. De
Samenvatting 133
geanalyseerde beleidsmaatregelen betreffen daarom combinaties van
arbeidsmarktprogramma's en verlaging van werkloosheidsuitkeringen. Hoewel werklozen
er door die verlaging van uitkeringen in eerste instantie op achteniit gaan, wordt met
behulp van simulaties aangetoond ciat, bij plausibele parameterwaarden, een geschikte
combinatie van beleidsmaatregelen kan leiden tot een evenwicht met een grotere
werkgelegenheid, lagere belastingen, en met hogere verwachte inkomens voor zowel
werklozen als werkenden. In dit evenwicht kiest niemand voor deelname aan een
arbeidsmarktprogramma.
Alhoewel dit een paradoxale situatie lijkt, kan deze situatie toch in de praktijk relevant
zijn. In Nederland kennen we bijvoorbeeld het Jeugdwerkgarantieplan. Sommigen hebben
erop gewezen dat dit plan misschien niet zo effectief is in het aanleren van vaardigheden.
Het plan kan er echter wel toe leiden dat jongeren actiever naar regulier werk zoeken
omdat ze liever niet in het Jeugdwerkgarantieplan terecht komen.
Voor de hierboven gegeven analyse zijn een aantal veronderstellingen in het model van
groot belang. Met name moeten individuen alleen kijken naar permanent inkomen, en is er
dus geen sprake van kredietbeperkingen, etc. ln het laatste gedeelte van hoofdstuk 2
wordt op een wat heuristische wijze gekeken hoe de tendens naar het evenwicht eruit zou
kunnen zien als kredietbeperkingen wel een rol spelen. Dan blijkt dat de maatregelen op
korte termijn nadelig kunnen zijn voor de re~uliere werkgelegenheid, en dat 'crowding in'
pas na enige tijd zal plaatsvinden.
In de hoofdstukken 3 en 4 wordt liet basismodel uitgebreid zodat rekening wordt
gehouden met het feit dat deelname aan het arbeidsmarktprogramma een positieve invloed
kan hebben op de zoekintensiteit van werklozen en de kans dat ze een baan vinden. In
hoofdstuk 3 zorgen de programma's ervoor dat langdurig werklozen die het contact met
de arbeidsmarkt verloren hebben, worden gerehabiliteerd, zodat ze weer op zoek gaan
naar een reguliere baan. Er wordt onderscheid gemaakt tussen effectieve en ineffectieve
werkloosheid. Een arbeidsmarktprogramma maakt van een ineffectief werkloze een
effectief werkloze. Effectief werklozen liebben een grotere kans op een baan. Toename
van het aantal eftèctief werklozen maakt dat vacatures korter open staan en kan via het
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matching proces tot meer werkgelegenheid leiden. De resultaten van de simulatie-analyse
in dit hoofdstuk tonen aan dat voor sommige beleidsvarianten de reguliere
werkgelegenheid toeneemt, terwijl voor andere varianten 'crowding out' plaatsvindt.
Gunstige effecten worden vooral bereikt bij varianten gerelateerd aan de analyse in
hoofdstuk 2, waarbij de werkloosheidsuitkeringen verlaagd worden en de
arbeidsmarktprogramma's alleen als sociaal vangnet dienen.
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt een ander realistisch aspect aan het model toegevoegd: de
programma's kunnen het menselijk kapitaal van de deelnemers verhogen. Menselijk
kapitaal kan worden aangevuld door ervaring in een reguliere baan, maar ook door
ervaring in vervangende werkgelegenheid binnen een programma. In dit hoofdstuk wordt
aangenomen dat niet alle programma's hierin even succesvol zijn: voor sommige
individuen laat deelname aan het programma het menselijk kapitaal ongewijzigd. Hierbij
kan gedacht worden aan inferieure banen die geen enkele ontwikkeling van vaardigheden
of kennis met zich meebrengen.
De simulatieresultaten laten zien dat ook in dit geval geen eenduidige uitspraken gedaan
kunnen worden, en dat veel afhangt van de ~ekozen modelparameters en de kwaliteit van
het werk in de arbeidsmarktprogramma's. Het is zelfs denkbaar dat de programma's alleen
maar leiden tot meer werklozen met een la~e produktiviteit, zodat het tegendeel bereikt
wordt van wat de programma's beogen. Dit zal het geval zijn als veel vervangende arbeid
inferieur is en niet leidt tot de gewenste stijging van menselijk kapitaal.
De studies in dit proefschrift laten zien dat actief arbeidsmarktbeleid een positieve bijdrage
kan leveren aan zowel het terugdringen van de werkloosheid als de bevordering van
reguliere werkgelegenheid. Dit is zeker het geval als het gekoppeld wordt aan beleid op
het gebied van belastingen en uitkeringen. Gunstige resultaten worden vooral geboekt in
die gevallen waarin de arbeidsmarktprogramma's op zich niet aantrekkelijk zijn, maar
fungeren als sociaal vangnet. Alleen in dit geval is een eenduidig positief effect op de
reguliere werkgelegenheid gegarandeerd. In de praktijk lijken dit soort programma's niet
erg realistisch. Een combinatie van diverse programma's die voor sommigen wel en voor
anderen wellicht niet aantrekkelijk zijn, kan dan echter tot goede resultaten leiden.






Static and Dynamic Aspects of General Disequilibrium
Theory; ISBN 90 5668 001 3
Erwin van der Krabben Urban Dynamics: A Real Estate Perspective - An
institutional analysis of the production of the built
environment; ISBN 90 5170 390 2
3 Arjan Lejour
4 Bas J.M. Werker
5 Rudy Douven
6 Arie J.T.M. Weeren
7 Herbert Hamers




12 W.B. van den Hout
13 Paul W.J. de Bijl
Integrating or Desintegrating Welfare States? - a qualitative
study to the consequences of economic integration on social
insurance; ISBN 90 5668 003 x
Statistical Methods in Financial Econometrics;
ISBN 90 5668 002 1
Policy Coordination and Convergence in the EU;
ISBN 90 5668 004 8
Coordination in Hierarchical Control; ISBN 90 5668 006 4
Sequencing and Delivery Situations: a Game Theoretic
Approach; ISBN 90 5668 005 6
Strategic Decision Making in Politics; ISBN 90 5668 007 2
Simplicial Fixed Point Algorithms and Applications;
ISBN 90 5668 008 0
Neural Networks in Economic Modelling - An Empirical
Study; ISBN 90 5668 O10 2
Acquisition of Technological Capability in Small Firms in
Developing Countries; ISBN 90 5668 009 9
The Power-Series Algoríthm - A Numerical Approach to
Markov Processes; ISBN 90 5668 O11 0
Essays in Industrial Organization and Management
Strategy; ISBN 90 5668 012 9
' Copies can be ordered from Thesis Publishers, P.O. Boz 14791, 1001 LG Amsterdam, The
Netherlands, phone t 31 20 6255429; faz: f31 20 6203395; e-mail: thesisC~thesis.aps.nl
No. Author
14 Martijn van de Ven






Intergenerational Redistribution in Representative
Democracies; ISBN 90 5668 013 7
Altruism, Fairness and Public Pensions: An Investigation of
Survey and Experimental Data; ISBN 90 5668 014 5
Competition in Spatial Location Models;
ISBN 90 5668 O15 3
Essays in Competition with Product Differentiation and
Bargaining in Markets; ISBN 90 5668 016 1
Three-Gap Analysis of Structural Adjustment in Pakistan;
ISBN 90 5668 017 x
A Treatise on Labour: A Matching-Model Analysis of
Labour-Market Programmes; ISBN 90 5668 018 8
u ~n u uiui iuiiuuii n iiiiiM~ íi iu ilïuii ~ u ~
JIMMY MILLER gradUb.-- ---.-. -- . ~~
000 O~ 2861 55 6 J
University in 1991. In 1992, he gained his M.Sc. in Economics from
London University. Since 1992, he has been a Ph.D. student. His
principal area of interest is labour economics, especially how
labour-market programmes affect unemployment, and whether they
crowd in or crowd out regular employment. He's a general all-round
nice bloke.
Labour-market programmes are often put forward as a means of
reducing unemployment; but they are not without problems.
Programmes may lead to crowding out of regular employment and
may even have the adverse effect of increasing unemployment. This
thesis looks theoretically at how labour-market programmes can be
used within a matching-model context. Various model set ups are
used and the overall result of this thesis is that programmes can
crowd in or crowd out regular employment, depending on the
structure of the labour market. Crowding in is only guaranteed when
programmes are used as a means of reducing the level of
unemployment benefits in the economy.
ISBN 90-5668-018-8
~-~!,~ ~~1y~av i~U ~1~~~~
